Canada has a mosaic of federal laws forming its legal framework for citizens' data protection. The Privacy Act regulates how the federal government handles personal information, while the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) covers how businesses handle personal information. Other federal laws target specific information, such as the Bank Act of 1871, while provincial laws contain provisions for confidentiality tied to credit unions and credit reporting.

Under the Accountability Principle, set out in section 4.1 of Schedule 1 of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, organisations are required to appoint an individual or individuals responsible for ensuring compliance with privacy regulations.

Canada's signal intelligence agency, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), does not have explicit powers to demand disclosure of personal information under the Communications Security Establishment Act. However, the Minister of National Defence can issue an authorisation to the CSE permitting it to "gain access to a portion of the global information infrastructure" to carry out any activity authorised in the furtherance of the active cyber operations aspect of its mandate (Sections 30 and 31). This authorisation could include a demand for access to personal information held by an organisation. Authorisations are time-limited, must have the consent of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and must be based on reasonable grounds to believe that the objective of the cyber operation could not be reasonably achieved by other means (Sections 33(4) and 34(4)).

The Copyright Act establishes a safe harbour regime for intermediaries for copyright infringements. According to Section 31.1(1), internet service providers (ISPs), provided that they are content-neutral, cannot be held liable for providing any means for Internet access.

In Canada, trade secret protection can be enforced through civil litigation, criminal prosecution, or both. Civil remedies are handled at the provincial level, based on common law (or civil law in Québec), and may involve claims such as breach of contract, misappropriation, or breach of confidence. In criminal cases, prosecution is determined by the Crown following police investigation. At the federal level, certain forms of undisclosed information are protected by laws such as the Security of Information Act and the Personal Information and Protection of Electronic Documents Act. In 2020, Canada amended its Criminal Code to explicitly criminalise trade secret theft through deceit or fraudulent means.
When courts assess whether information qualifies as a trade secret or whether it has been misused, they consider several factors, such as: how well the information was kept secret, its economic value, how much time or money it took to create, how easily others could develop it independently, and whether both the owner and the recipient treated it as confidential. Courts also look at whether the recipient should have known it was confidential and whether the misuse caused harm to the owner.

There is no obligation for passive infrastructure sharing in Canada to deliver telecom services to end users. However, passive infrastructure sharing is practiced in the mobile sector and in the fixed sector based on commercial agreements.

Saskatchewan Telecommunications is the only government-owned company in the Canadian telecommunications market and it is owned by the province of the same name. According to its statutes, foreign direct investment is not allowed in this company.

Telecommunication carriers, including internet service providers that own and operate transmission facilities, are subject to foreign investment restrictions if they hold a 10% or greater share of total Canadian communication annual market revenues, as mandated by the Telecommunications Act. According to Art. 16 of the Act, a Canadian carrier is eligible to operate as a telecommunications common carrier if it is incorporated, organised, or continued under Canadian or provincial laws and is Canadian-owned and controlled, operates only a specified transmission facility, or generates less than 10% of its annual revenue from telecommunications services in Canada. To qualify as Canadian-owned and controlled, Canadians must own at least 80% of the voting interests, and the entity must not be controlled by non-Canadians.

The Saskatchewan Telecommunications Holding Corporation, commonly known as SaskTel, is a Canadian Crown corporation based in Saskatchewan. Owned by the provincial government, SaskTel offers a range of telecommunications services, including wireline and wireless communications. Its services encompass landline telephone, mobile networks, broadband internet (such as copper DSL, fibre to the home, and wireless broadband), IPTV, and security solutions.

It is reported that Canada does not mandate functional or accounting separation for operators with significant market power (SMP) in the telecom market.

Canada has appended the World Trade Organization (WTO) Telecom Reference Paper to its schedule of commitments.

According to the Broadcasting Act, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, the executive authority for the supervision and administration of services in the telecommunications sector, is independent from the government in the decision-making process.

Canada has joined agreements with binding commitments to open transfers of data across borders: the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, Art. 14.11), the United States - Mexico - Canada Agreement (Art. 19.11) and the Canada - Ukraine Modernized Free Trade Agreement (Art. 8.10).

Foreign investment in Canada is primarily governed by the Investment Canada Act (ICA), which provides review procedures based on economic benefit, cultural impact, and national security. Under Part IV.1, any investment by a non-Canadian—whether to establish a new business, acquire control of an existing one, or acquire or establish an entity operating in Canada—may be reviewed if it is considered potentially injurious to national security. This applies even to small investments, as there is no monetary threshold for national security reviews. Control is typically presumed at over 50% of voting interest, but may also apply at over one-third under certain conditions.
In addition, investments that exceed established thresholds must pass a “net benefit” review, with criteria varying based on the investor’s origin (e.g. from countries with trade agreements like the U.S., EU, or Israel) and whether the investor is a state-owned or private entity. Furthermore, since March 2022, acquisitions involving Russian investors face exceptional scrutiny: they are presumed not to be of net benefit to Canada, and any direct or indirect ties to the Russian state may trigger a national security review under the ICA.

Pursuant to Art. 25.2 of the Investment Canada Act (ICA), where the Minister has reasonable grounds to believe that a foreign investment may be injurious to national security, a notice may be issued to the foreign investor indicating that the investment is subject to review. The Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, in consultation with the Minister of Public Safety, is responsible for conducting the review and coordinating with relevant investigative bodies.
If investors are notified that their proposed investment is considered potentially injurious to national security, the Minister must decide within 45 days whether to refer the investment for an extended national security review. In accordance with the National Security Review of Investments Regulations, the review period for notified transactions may last up to 45 days and can be extended once for an additional 45 days, if necessary.
Following the completion of the process, and in accordance with Art. 25.4 of the ICA, the investment may be (i) prohibited, (ii) permitted subject to conditions imposed by the Governor in Council, or (iii) if already implemented, made subject to a divestiture order.
The Guideline on the National Security Review outlines factors considered in the review, including sensitive technologies, critical minerals, critical infrastructure, sensitive personal data, and investments involving state-owned or state-influenced entities. However, the authorities reportedly note that the listed factors are illustrative and not exhaustive.