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UNITED STATES

Since 2006

Pillar Public procurement of ICT goods and online services  |  Indicator Exclusion from public procurement
Exclusion of company from public procurement
The US Department of State has decided not to use Lenovo Group Ltd. computers on a classified network, under fears that hardware-level backdoors could exist in these products. Lenovo hardware is also reportedly banned by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), although no evidence of any wrongdoing on Lenovo's part has been presented.
Coverage Lenovo

UNITED STATES

Since June 2023

Pillar Public procurement of ICT goods and online services  |  Indicator Exclusion from public procurement
No TikTok on Government Devices Act
In June 2023, the U.S. Federal Government issued the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) clause, FAR 52.204-27, implementing the No TikTok on Government Devices Act. This clause prohibits the presence or use of the TikTok application on IT equipment used by government contractors and their personnel during the performance of a federal contract. The measure was introduced to protect government information in response to national security concerns. The regulation took effect immediately and applies to all new government contracts, including those that fall below the simplified acquisition threshold, as well as contracts for commercial products and commercial services.
It is reported that certain related restrictions apply since January 2020, when the United States Army and Navy banned TikTok from government devices following the Defense Department's designation of the app as a security risk. A Navy bulletin posted on a Facebook page for military personnel warned that users of government-issued mobile devices who did not remove TikTok would be blocked from accessing the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet.
Coverage TikTok

UNITED STATES

Since March 2013
Since December 2017
Since August 2018

Pillar Public procurement of ICT goods and online services  |  Indicator Exclusion from public procurement
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013

National Defence Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 2018

John S. McCain National defence authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 2019
After the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence’s 2012 report, the United States enacted several laws (beginning with the Consolidated and Further Appropriations Act, 2013) that restrict federal procurement of and grant and loan spending on Huawei systems. Although the 2013 Appropriations Act does not name Huawei, some observers and Members of Congress described it as designed to address risks posed by Huawei and ZTE.
In the National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018, the United States placed Huawei-related restrictions into federal law beyond the context of appropriations. The 2018 NDAA prohibits the Department of Defence (DOD) from procuring certain telecommunications equipment or services from Huawei and others as part of the DOD’s missions related to nuclear deterrence and homeland defence. Unlike earlier appropriations provisions, the 2018 NDAA names Huawei in the legislation. The 2018 NDAA prohibits DOD from procuring, obtaining, extending, or renewing contracts that include telecommunications equipment or services provided by Huawei, ZTE, or any entity that the Secretary of Defence reasonably believes is owned, controlled by, or “otherwise connected to” the Chinese or Russian governments. To fall within the 2018 NDAA, the telecommunications equipment or services must be a substantial or essential component or critical technology of the system provided to the DOD for its nuclear deterrence or homeland defence missions.
The John S. McCain National Defence Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 2019 provides a broader set of Huawei-related restrictions that apply across the executive branch. It restricts [Section 889(a)(1)(A)] executive agencies from procuring systems that contain Huawei equipment or services and prohibits [Section 889(a)(1)(B)] executive agencies from contracting with companies that use Huawei equipment or services in the companies’ own systems—even if those systems are not sold to the government. The Joe Biden administration has stepped up restrictions on Huawei and ZTE, citing national security concerns.
Coverage Huawei, ZTE, other Chinese and Russian network equipment and services

UNITED STATES

Since March 2020, last amended in September 2022

Pillar Public procurement of ICT goods and online services  |  Indicator Exclusion from public procurement
List of Equipment and Services Covered By Section 2 of The Secure Networks Act
Section 1.50002 of the Commission's rules mandates that the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau publish a "Covered List" of communications equipment and services deemed to pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security or the safety of U.S. persons. This designation is based on specific sources of risk assessment. Telecommunications providers in the U.S. are prohibited from using Federal Communications Commission (FCC) funds to acquire such equipment or services. The Covered List includes several foreign companies, such as Huawei, ZTE, Hytera Communications, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology, Dahua Technology, AO Kaspersky Lab, China Mobile International USA, China Telecom (Americas) Corp, Pacific Networks Corp, and China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited. Telecom providers are also required to remove any equipment or services from companies on this list from their networks.
Coverage Huawei, ZTE, Hytera Communications, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology, Dahua Technology, AO Kaspersky Lab, China Mobile International USA, China Telecom (Americas) Corp, Pacific Networks Corp, China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited

UNITED STATES

Since March 2013

Pillar Public procurement of ICT goods and online services  |  Indicator Other limitations on foreign participation in public procurement
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013
Section 535 in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (H.R.933) bars the Departments of Commerce and Justice, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Science Foundation from procuring any information technology (IT) systems that are produced, manufactured, or assembled by any company owned, directed, or subsidised by the People’s Republic of China unless the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has completed an assessment of the security risk of cyber espionage or sabotage associated with the system to the United States.
Coverage Information technology (IT) systems
"SELECT DISTINCT(post_id) FROM prj_12_postmeta WHERE meta_key = 'score' AND\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpost_id IN (SELECT post_id FROM prj_12_postmeta WHERE meta_key = 'country' AND meta_value = 'US')\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tAND (\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpost_id IN (SELECT post_id FROM prj_12_postmeta WHERE meta_key = 'subchapter' AND meta_value = '1.1') OR\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpost_id IN (SELECT post_id FROM prj_12_postmeta WHERE meta_key = 'subchapter' AND meta_value = '1.2') OR\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpost_id IN (SELECT post_id FROM prj_12_postmeta WHERE meta_key = 'subchapter' AND meta_value = '1.3')\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t)"
[{"post_id":"104452"},{"post_id":"104453"},{"post_id":"104454"}]
"SELECT meta_value FROM prj_12_postmeta WHERE meta_key = 'impact' AND\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpost_id IN (SELECT post_id FROM prj_12_postmeta WHERE meta_key = 'country' AND meta_value = 'US')\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tAND (\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpost_id IN (SELECT post_id FROM prj_12_postmeta WHERE meta_key = 'subchapter' AND meta_value = '1.1') OR\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpost_id IN (SELECT post_id FROM prj_12_postmeta WHERE meta_key = 'subchapter' AND meta_value = '1.2')\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t)"
"SELECT meta_value FROM prj_12_postmeta WHERE meta_key = 'score' AND\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpost_id IN (SELECT post_id FROM prj_12_postmeta WHERE meta_key = 'country' AND meta_value = 'US')\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tAND (\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpost_id IN (SELECT post_id FROM prj_12_postmeta WHERE meta_key = 'subchapter' AND meta_value = '1.3')\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t)"
ITA: [{"meta_value":"0.00"}]

UNITED STATES

ITA signatory? I II

Pillar Tariffs and trade defence measures applied on ICT goods  |  Indicator Effective tariff rate on ICT goods (applied weighted average)
Effective tariff rate to ICT goods (applied weighted average)
0.56%
Coverage rate of zero-tariffs on ICT goods (%)
74.96%
Coverage: ICT goods

UNITED STATES

Since March 1997
Since December 2015

Pillar Tariffs and trade defence measures applied on ICT goods  |  Indicator Participation in the WTO Information Technology Agreement (ITA) and 2015 expansion (ITA II)
Information Technology Agreement (ITA)

ITA Expansion Agreement (ITA II)
The U.S. is a signatory of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Information Technology Agreement (ITA) of 1996 and its 2015 expansion (ITA II).
Coverage ICT goods

UNITED STATES

Since October 2008, last extended in June 2020, until 2025

Pillar Tariffs and trade defence measures applied on ICT goods  |  Indicator Antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguard measures on ICT goods
Antidumping measure
In October 2008, the United States authorities imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on the import of electrolytic manganese dioxide (HS Code: 282010), which is the critical component of the cathode material in modern alkaline, lithium and sodium batteries, including electrochemical capacitors and hydrogen production. The duty applies to imports from Chinese firms, most notably Guizhou Redstar Developing Import and Export Company, Ltd. This measure was extended in January 2015 and subsequently in July 2020. The rate of duty on imports from China is 149.9%.
Coverage Product: Electrolytic manganese dioxide (HS Code: 282010)

Country: China

UNITED STATES

Since June 1991, last extended in November 2023, until 2028

Pillar Tariffs and trade defence measures applied on ICT goods  |  Indicator Antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguard measures on ICT goods
Antidumping measure
In June 1991, the United States authorities imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal (HS Code: 280469) from China, which is used also for producing silicon compounds as well as silicon wafers used as electronic semiconductors. This measure was last extended in June 2018. The rate of duty on imports from China is 139.5%.
Coverage Product: Silicon Metal (HS Code: 280469)

Country: China

UNITED STATES

Since March 2003, last extended in June 2020, until June 2025

Pillar Tariffs and trade defence measures applied on ICT goods  |  Indicator Antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguard measures on ICT goods
Antidumping measure
In March 2003, the United States authorities imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal (HS Code: 280469) from Russia, which is also used for producing silicon compounds as well as silicon wafers used as electronic semiconductors. This measure was last extended in June 2020. The rate of duty on imports from Russia is 79.4% for all companies, with the exception of Russian ZAO Kremny/Sual-Kremny-Ural Ltd, which gets a 56.1% duty.
Coverage Product: Silicon Metal (HS Code: 280469)

Country: Russia

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