According to the Ministry of Communications, a process is implemented that requires a homologation certificate issued after control in testing laboratories in Cuba for ICT goods. Although there is no legal framework establishing the procedures for testing, control and certification of these goods, the Ministry requires companies to pass certain tests to obtain a homologation certificate for each product or service of telecommunication and computer equipment. There are two accredited laboratories in Cuba. The first one performs tropicalisation tests. The second one handles the testing of equipment connected to telecommunications networks that use the spectrum. Through this certification process, the Ministry of Communications regulates and controls the technical and operating specifications of the systems, equipment, and devices to be used in telecommunications and computer networks in order to guarantee the interconnection between public networks, as well as the interoperability of services.

Art. 19 (e) of Resolution No. 179/08 requires that Internet access service providers must ensure that software with cryptographic systems or encrypted file transfer is not used.

Resolution No. 128/2011 regulates data private networks. Art. 2 (c) defines a private data network as a network infrastructure installed in the same location (or in different geographic locations) and interconnected among them by public and private telecommunications links managed and operated by a legal person to meet its institutional data transmission needs. Art. 19 (5) of this Resolution establishes the requirement of official approval from the Ministry of Communications to use any type of application or service supported by a private network that implies encryption of the information that is transmitted and the Ministry requires compatibility with the IPv6 Protocol for contracted services.

Although Law 118 on foreign investment does not restrict investments in the online commerce sector, the state company CIMEX, with its company Tuenvio.cu, is the only platform that offers online purchases in Cuba.

According to Art. 69 of Decree-Law No. 35, telecom operators and providers, in coordination with authorities, must implement technical measures to minimise risks associated with their networks and services. They must also interrupt services if used to harm other operators or countries, transmit false, offensive, or harmful information, or content that is sexual, discriminatory, harassing, invades privacy, or affects personal dignity, identity, integrity, public morality, public order, or is used for illegal acts, irrespective of any resulting criminal, civil, or administrative liability.

Art. 53 of Decree 42/2021 establishes the permission for the Cuban state communications company to block or suspend the networks used to disseminate information considered false or harmful to "public order".

Decree Law 370/2019 prohibits Cuban citizens from hosting their writings on foreign servers, including social media platforms such as Facebook, and prohibits the circulation of "information contrary to social interest, morality, good customs and the integrity of people". It has been reported that this decree has been used to block blogs and independent journalism publications. For example, Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba S.A. (ETECSA) blocks dissident or independent media outlets and the sites of Cuban activists and dissident organisations and recently began blocking foreign media outlets that do not focus on Cuban content. The Miami Herald and El Nuevo Herald were blocked as of December 2020. Major Cuban news and journalism sites that are blocked in Cuba include El Estornudo, 14ymedio, Diario de Cuba, Cibercuba, CubaNet, Cuba Encuentro, Periódico Cubano, La Asociación Pro Libertad de Prensa, Gato Pardo, Tremenda Nota, Proyecto Inventario, Rialta and Martí Noticias as of December 2020.

Resolution No. 179/2008 allows the restriction of sites and applications that are contrary to social interests, ethics, and morals and/or threaten State security by public internet access service providers. If providers fail to do so, according to Art. 21, their licenses can be invalidated or their contracts suspended. It is reported that this broadly worded law has been used to block websites like Yahoo, Facebook, Twitter, Telegram, and WhatsApp following the protest on 27 November 2020, which took place after authorities raided the headquarters of Movimiento San Isidro (MSI). Facebook was also intermittently inaccessible, while home and mobile subscribers experienced widespread service outages. Cuban internet users reported that Telegram was inaccessible for approximately five weeks as of October 2020, along with several popular VPNs.

It is reported that the Cuban government frequently disrupts internet access in response to public protests. These shutdowns are implemented nationwide, even though the protests are localised. Notable instances include the September 2022 shutdown during Hurricane Ian and the May 2023 shutdown during the Caimanera protests. In addition, the indicator "6.2.4 - Government Internet shut down in practice" of the V-Dem Dataset, which measures whether the government has the technical capacity to actively make internet service cease, thus interrupting domestic access to the internet or whether the government has decided to do so, has a score of 2 in Cuba for the year 2023. This corresponds to "The government shut down domestic access to the Internet several times this year."

Digital advertisement is administered and managed by Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba S.A. Advertisers who wish to publish content on the network must use the services of this state company. Other alternatives, also state-owned, are Offer, from the Cuban News Agency (ACN) and the services of Cubavisión International or Radio Taíno. Cuba has an absence of regulation in the field of communication. The most advanced in this regard is the bill on Advertising, Promotion, Public Relations, Institutional Propaganda and Public Good Propaganda drafted by a commission of the former Cuban Association of Publicists and Propagandists (ACPP).

According to Art. 8 of Decree-Law 370, the Ministry of Communications issues licenses to providers of services related to the computerisation of Cuba so that they can project, install, maintain and market computer programs and applications according to the conditions set forth in the law.

According to Art. 2 of Resolution No. 153, all entities established in Cuba to carry out export or import activities must be registered in the National Registry of Exporters and Importers. It is reported that there are costs and delays in the process of registering a company as an authorised supplier. While there is no fee to register, companies have reported that total translation and legalisation costs in both countries range from US$5,000 to US$10,000, depending on the size of the company and the number of documents required. If the company has not been in business for a period of two years, the registration lapses, and the process must begin again.

Decree-Law 46/2021, for the first time, puts the regulation and standards of private sector companies into a legal framework. Given the nature of standards and norms legislation in Cuba, where the government publishes laws through decrees approved by the Communist Party Assembly, foreign companies cannot participate in institutional bodies that establish and regulate trade norms. Decree-Law 46/2021 establishes the rules and regulations on the private sector for all micro, small and medium-sized companies that make up the private sector permitted by the state. The government establishes in Chapter IV the norms related to the control and inspection of the goods and services of the private sector. The government issues the Decree unilaterally without the participation of foreign entities.

According to Art. 110.1 (Chapter II ) of the Decree-Law No. 389 of 2019, the authorities can carry out electronic surveillance without prior judicial approval and use the information obtained in criminal cases.

Reports indicate that government surveillance of internet activity in Cuba is extensive, often leading to the interception of private communications. Internet access is exclusively provided by state-owned monopoly companies, granting the government unrestricted and unregulated legal authority to monitor the use of email, social media, online chat rooms, and web browsing by both citizens and foreigners. Furthermore, the government exercises strict oversight of access points, including Wi-Fi hotspots, cybercafés, and public access centres, in addition to maintaining direct control over the backbone internet infrastructure.