A basic legal framework on intermediary liability for copyright infringement is absent in China's law and jurisprudence. A safe harbour defence for internet intermediaries providing hosting services is spelt out in the Guiding Framework on Protection of Copyright for Network Dissemination (Art. 14-17, 22). The hosting defence established in Art. 22, only applies to service providers who host third-party materials. However, Art. 36 of the Tort Law of the People's Republic of China states that a "network service provider" shall assume the tort liability if it infringes "upon the civil right or interest of another person."
Furthermore, the Tort Law allows victims of the tort to notify the network service provider to demand the deletion, blocking or disconnection of the cause of infringement. Failing to do so can lead to further liability for the network provider in the event of further harm to the user. Finally, liability can be further increased in the event that the network service provider knew of the infringement but did not take action.

Section 9.2.i of the 2020 Specification provides that where personal biometric information must not be shared or transferred unless actually essential for business needs, in which case the personal information subject must be separately informed of the purpose, types of biometrics involved, identification of the recipient and its data security capacity and the personal information subject consent must be explicitly obtained.

A basic legal framework on intermediary liability beyond copyright infringement is absent in China's law and jurisprudence. A safe harbour defence for internet intermediaries providing hosting services is spelt out in the Guiding Framework on Protection of Copyright for Network Dissemination (Art. 14-17, 22). The hosting defence established in Art. 22, only applies to service providers who host third-party materials. However, Art. 36 of the Tort Law of the People's Republic of China states that a "network service provider" shall assume the tort liability if it infringes "upon the civil right or interest of another person."
Furthermore, the Tort Law allows victims of the tort to notify the network service provider to demand the deletion, blocking or disconnection of the cause of infringement. Failing to do so can lead to further liability for the network provider in the event of further harm to the user. Finally, liability can be further increased in the event that the network service provider knew of the infringement but did not take action.

China has not joined any agreement with binding commitments on data flows.

According to the Administrative Provisions on Information Services of Mobile Internet Application Program, app providers must ensure that new app users register with their real names by verifying users’ mobile phone numbers and/or other identity information.

According to Art. 34 of Map Management Regulations, online maps are required to set up their server inside the country and acquire an official certificate.

It is reported that China's Telecommunications Regulations require all data collected within the country to be stored on Chinese servers. However, the relevant article has not been found in the regulations. Moreover, it is reported that, as a result of this regulation, Hewlett-Packard, Qualcomm, and Uber had to divest more than 50% of their businesses in China to Chinese companies to avoid fines.

Art. 37 of the Cybersecurity Law requires "key information infrastructure" operators to store personal information and critical data within China. Personal information and critical data can be stored outside of China where there is a genuine need for business; in such cases a "security assessment" needs to be conducted in accordance with procedures formulated by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) in collabouration with other authorities.
Art. 4 of the Outbound Data Transfer Security Assessment Measures, promulgated by the CAC, outlines four situations where a security assessment is necessary before an outbound transfer can take place, which include:
1) Cases where the transfer concerns “important data”, which is broadly defined as data that could endanger national security, economic operation, social stability, public health and safety;
2) Cases the transfer concerns personal data by a critical information infrastructure operator or processor of personal information that processed data for 1 million or more individuals;
3) Cases of transfers concerning personal data by a personal information processor that has made outbound transfers of personal information of 100,000 individuals or sensitive personal information of 10,000 persons in the preceding year;
4) Any other situation where the CAC deems a security assessment necessary.
Art. 8 of the Measures covers the factors the CAC considers when undertaking a security assessment, including:
- The risks that the transfer may entail for national security or public interests, among other policy objectives;
- Legitimacy, necessity and method of transfer;
- Whether the level of data protection in the recipient country meets the requirements of laws in China;
- Sensitivity of the data and risks of being tampered with abroad;
- Agreed safeguard measures between the data processor and data recipient;
- Any other matter that the CAC deems necessary.
In case of unfavourable outcomes, the data handler can ask the CAC for a re-assessment and a final decision. In case of a positive decision, the permission to transfer data abroad is valid for two years, but if substantial changes in the risk factors arise, a new assessment might be needed.

Art. 31 of the Data Security Law provides that the security administration of the cross-border transfer of important data collected and generated by critical information infrastructure operators during their operation in China shall be subject to the provisions of the Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China; the administrative measures for the cross-border transfer of important data collected and generated by other data processors during their operation in China shall be formulated by the national cyberspace administration authority in collabouration with relevant departments of the State Council. In addition, Art. 36 stipulates that the competent authority of China shall process the request for providing any data from a foreign judicial body and law enforcement body in accordance with relevant laws and the international treaty or agreement which China has concluded or acceded to, or under the principle of equality and mutual benefit. Any organization or individual within the territory of China shall not provide any foreign judicial body or law enforcement body with any data stored within the territory of the People's Republic of China without the approval of the competent authority of China.

According to Art. 27 of the Provisional Measures for Administration of Business Activities of Internet Lending Information Intermediaries, the lender and borrower information collected within China shall be stored, processed, and analysed in China. Unless otherwise provided by laws and regulations, online lending information intermediaries shall not provide information on domestic lenders and borrowers overseas.

According to Art. 24 of the Regulation on the Administration of Credit Investigation Industry, credit reporting agencies must organise, preserve, and process consumer or commercial data within China.

According to the Regulation on the Management of Human Genetic Resources, the export of human genetic resources information from China is prohibited unless explicitly approved in accordance with this Regulation. Under Arts. 7, 8, 9, and 10, the provision of human genetic resources to foreign entities must comply with ethical principles, undergo corresponding ethical reviews, and meet the technical standards established by the scientific administrative departments of the State Council. Such actions must not compromise public health, national security, or public interests. The sale of human genetic resources is strictly forbidden. Foreign organisations and individuals, as well as entities directly controlled by them, are prohibited from transferring China’s human genetic resources abroad.
Art. 28 stipulates that, in addition to a record filing, any provision of data to foreign parties or the permission for its use by foreign parties requires submission of a copy of the relevant data to the Office of Human Genetic Resource Administration within the Ministry of Science and Technology. A “security assessment” may also be required if the provision or use of such data could potentially affect China's public health, national security, or public interest. Art. 37 of the Implementation Rules details the categories of human genetic resources information that must undergo a national security review before being transferred or made accessible to foreign parties. Particular attention must be given to the export of genetic resources information, including that related to significant genetic families or populations from specific geographic regions, or exome sequencing and genome sequencing data involving more than 500 human subjects.

Art. 25 of the Law on Guarding State Secrets prohibits the export of carriers containing state secrets. According to Art. 17, such carriers include paper, optical, and electromagnetic media that bear state secrets. This law revises legislation of the same name from 1988, in which Art. 26 prohibited the cross-border transfer of any data containing state secrets.

According to Arts. 11 and 12 of the Provisions on Management of Automotive Data Security (Trial), important data must be stored domestically in compliance with legal requirements. If cross-border data transfer is necessary, security assessments must be conducted in coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China and other relevant governmental authorities. Furthermore, the Management Provisions stipulate that vehicle data processors who provide important data to foreign entities must adhere strictly to the purpose, scope, method, type, and scale of data as specified in the security assessment. Data categorized as important includes video and image data captured outside of vehicles that contain facial information and personal information pertaining to 100,000 or more identified or identifiable vehicle owners, drivers, passengers, and individuals outside the vehicles.

Art. 5 of the Interim Measures mandates that online taxi reservation platforms must maintain their servers within the territorial boundaries of China.