The UK has a clear regime of copyright exceptions that follows the fair dealing, which enables the lawful use of copyrighted work by others without obtaining permission. Sections 29 and 30 of the Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988 enumerate the three scenarios in which fair dealing exceptions can be made to UK copyright law for purposes of research or private study, of criticism or review, and for the purpose of reporting current events.

The National Security and Investment Act 2021 (NSI Act) is an investment screening mechanism that gives the government power of review over domestic and foreign investment along national security grounds. The NSI Act creates a mandatory notification requirement for firms as well as a dedicated body, the Investment Security Unit, to review all qualifying investments. Investments in 17 sectors, including communications, data infrastructure, quantum technologies, dual use technologies, and satellite and space technologies are reviewable as long as certain ownership threshold requirements are met or the transaction allows for the "material influence" over the entity. The NSI Act does not solely apply to mergers and acquisitions, but also purchases of physical capital and intellectual property. In 2021, the first case of blocking occured when Chinese company Beijing Infinite Vision Technology was prohibited from acquiring IP developed and owned by the University of Manchester.

Although the United Kingdom is a signatory to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), its coverage schedules do not include "telecommunications-related services" (CPC 754), which is an important services sector for digital trade.
The United Kingdom joined the GPA 2012, in its own right, on 1 January 2021. The country had previously been covered by the GPA 1994 and subsequently by the GPA 2012 as a member State of the European Union and later in accordance with the Withdrawal Agreement concluded between the European Union and the United Kingdom and relevant decisions of the WTO Committee on Government Procurement. From 2018 to 2020, the United Kingdom negotiated with GPA Parties on GPA membership in its own right. On 2 December 2020, the United Kingdom deposited its instrument of accession to the GPA 2012.

In August 2021, the Cabinet Office has published the Public Procurement Note 11/20 outlining how and when "in-scope organisations" can reserve contracts based on supplier location and size. In-scope organisations are defined as commercial practitioners at all levels within central government departments, executive agencies and non-departmental public bodies. The thresholds below which these reservations can be made are:
- Supplies and services - £122,976 (approx. USD 137,000);
- Services defined under the "Light Touch Regime" (LTR), which refers to certain service contracts that tend to be of lower interest to cross-border competition - £ 663,540 (approx. USD 730,000).
If these threshold requirement are met, in-scope organizations can reserve procurements based on supplier location (UK-wide, county, borough) or may limit competition to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and Voluntary Community and Social Enterprises (VCSEs).

Art. 85 of the Utilities Directive (2014/25/EU) contains provisions allowing contracting public entities to reject foreign goods not covered by any EU international commitments from its tender procedures. In these cases, a tender submitted for the award of a supply contract may be rejected where the proportion of the products originating in third countries exceeds 50% of the total value of the products constituting the tender (Art. 85.2). Additionally, in cases of equivalent offers, the provisions provide for a preference for European tenders and tenders covered by EU's international obligations. In practice, this possibility has rarely been used.
The Utilities Contracts Regulations 2016 implements the EU's Utilities Directive (2014/25/EU) in the United Kingdom. The Directive contains provisions allowing contracting public entities to reject from its tender procedures foreign goods not covered by any EU international commitments.

In 2017, the UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NSCS) has warned the public institutions in the UK against using the Russia anti-virus software Kaspersky on grounds of national security. This is following concerns about Kaspersky Lab's connections with Russian security services. Britain's NCSC has not issued a blanket warning to the public against using Kaspersky software, although it has warned the Government not to use it in networks that hold official secrets. It has been reported that members of the UK Parliament have suggested this warning be extended to the private sector as well.
In March 2002, the NCSC published a new warning, advising public sector organisations, any organisations providing services to Ukraine, high-profile enterprises that, if compromised, would “represent a PR win for Russia”, operators of critical national infrastructure, or any organisation doing work that could be perceived as counter to Moscow’s interests, for example charities and NGOs, to reconsider their risk exposure to technology of Russian origin, including Kaspersky.

Section 39 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (SBEE) gives the Minister for the Cabinet Office or relevant Secretary of State the power to impose regulations on public procurement in order to meet the goal to increase government spending with SMEs (the goal moved from 25% in 2015 to 33% in 2020).

All government bodies must comply with Open Standards Principles for software interoperability data and document formats in government IT and they must apply for an exemption if they do not comply with these requirements. Additionally, the Government has mandated a preference for using open source software for future developments and has issued a manual that lays out the standards that must be used for all new digital public services developed across the British central governmental administration. Principle 12 of the Government Digital Service (GDS) Service Standard states: "Make all new source code open and reusable, and publish it under appropriate licences. Or if this is not possible, provide a convincing explanation of why this cannot be done for specific subsets of the source code."

The Telecommunications Security Act 2021 gives the UK government the powers to remove high-security risk vendors from the UK telecommunications infrastructure. The Act specifically bans new purchases of equipment from Chinese telecommunications company Huawei and mandates the removal of all Huawei equipment from the 5G network by 2027. Moreover, according to Ofcom, the Act "allows the government to set out specific security requirements that providers must meet. This will include making sure telecoms providers securely design, construct and maintain network equipment that handles sensitive data; reduce supply chain risks; carefully control access to sensitive parts of the network; and make sure the right processes are in place to understand the risks facing their public networks and services." The Electronic Communications (Security Measures) Regulations 2022 supplements the Act, providing 16 regulations that further detail security measures expected to be put in place by network or service providers, ranging from securely designing and maintaining their public network, to helping their third party suppliers to identify and reduce risks of security compromise.

The United Kingdom is a signatory of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Information Technology Agreement (ITA) of 1996 and its 2015 expansion (ITA II).

Uganda has adopted national legislation based on or influenced by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Electronic Commerce.

Uganda has adopted national legislation based on or influenced by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Electronic Signatures.

Uganda has not signed the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts.

The Electronic Transactions Act provides a comprehensive framework for consumer protection that also applies to online transactions. Sections 24-28 set consumer protection requirements for ICT suppliers including providing relevant information such as the legal names, addresses of supplier(s), price, description, and applicable warranties of products as well provisions for cancellation of electronic transactions.