After the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence’s 2012 report, the United States enacted several laws (beginning with the Consolidated and Further Appropriations Act, 2013) that restrict federal procurement of and grant and loan spending on Huawei systems. Although the 2013 Appropriations Act does not name Huawei, some observers and Members of Congress described it as designed to address risks posed by Huawei and ZTE.
In the National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018, the United States placed Huawei-related restrictions into federal law beyond the context of appropriations. The 2018 NDAA prohibits the Department of Defence (DOD) from procuring certain telecommunications equipment or services from Huawei and others as part of the DOD’s missions related to nuclear deterrence and homeland defence. Unlike earlier appropriations provisions, the 2018 NDAA names Huawei in the legislation. The 2018 NDAA prohibits DOD from procuring, obtaining, extending, or renewing contracts that include telecommunications equipment or services provided by Huawei, ZTE, or any entity that the Secretary of Defence reasonably believes is owned, controlled by, or “otherwise connected to” the Chinese or Russian governments. To fall within the 2018 NDAA, the telecommunications equipment or services must be a substantial or essential component or critical technology of the system provided to the DOD for its nuclear deterrence or homeland defence missions.
The John S. McCain National Defence Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 2019 provides a broader set of Huawei-related restrictions that apply across the executive branch. It restricts [Section 889(a)(1)(A)] executive agencies from procuring systems that contain Huawei equipment or services and prohibits [Section 889(a)(1)(B)] executive agencies from contracting with companies that use Huawei equipment or services in the companies’ own systems—even if those systems are not sold to the government. The Joe Biden administration has stepped up restrictions on Huawei and ZTE, citing national security concerns.

Section 1.50002 of the Commission's rules mandates that the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau publish a "Covered List" of communications equipment and services deemed to pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security or the safety of U.S. persons. This designation is based on specific sources of risk assessment. Telecommunications providers in the U.S. are prohibited from using Federal Communications Commission (FCC) funds to acquire such equipment or services. The Covered List includes several foreign companies, such as Huawei, ZTE, Hytera Communications, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology, Dahua Technology, AO Kaspersky Lab, China Mobile International USA, China Telecom (Americas) Corp, Pacific Networks Corp, and China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited. Telecom providers are also required to remove any equipment or services from companies on this list from their networks.

Section 535 in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (H.R.933) bars the Departments of Commerce and Justice, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Science Foundation from procuring any information technology (IT) systems that are produced, manufactured, or assembled by any company owned, directed, or subsidised by the People’s Republic of China unless the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has completed an assessment of the security risk of cyber espionage or sabotage associated with the system to the United States.

Under the Trade Agreements Act (TAA), if the acquisition value of the tender is above a certain purchasing threshold (usually USD 200,000, although sometimes lower), US suppliers must turn to either domestic producers or countries with which the US maintains a free trade agreement (FTA). The TAA opens procurement markets only for products from the US or these so-called “designated countries” and prohibits procurement of end products from non-designated countries (e.g. China, India, Indonesia, Thailand). The purchasing threshold that needs to be reached to involve the TAA depends on the FTA in question and is updated every two years.

The U.S. is a signatory of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Information Technology Agreement (ITA) of 1996 and its 2015 expansion (ITA II).

In October 2008, the United States authorities imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on the import of electrolytic manganese dioxide (HS Code: 282010), which is the critical component of the cathode material in modern alkaline, lithium and sodium batteries, including electrochemical capacitors and hydrogen production. The duty applies to imports from Chinese firms, most notably Guizhou Redstar Developing Import and Export Company, Ltd. This measure was extended in January 2015 and subsequently in July 2020. The rate of duty on imports from China is 149.9%.

In June 1991, the United States authorities imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal (HS Code: 280469) from China, which is used also for producing silicon compounds as well as silicon wafers used as electronic semiconductors. This measure was last extended in June 2018. The rate of duty on imports from China is 139.5%.

In March 2003, the United States authorities imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal (HS Code: 280469) from Russia, which is also used for producing silicon compounds as well as silicon wafers used as electronic semiconductors. This measure was last extended in June 2020. The rate of duty on imports from Russia is 79.4% for all companies, with the exception of Russian ZAO Kremny/Sual-Kremny-Ural Ltd, which gets a 56.1% duty.

The UK has not signed the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts.

The UK has not adopted national legislation based on or influenced by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Electronic Commerce.

The UK has not adopted national legislation based on or influenced by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Electronic Signatures.

It is reported that the de minimis threshold, that is the minimum value of goods below which customs do not charge duties, is GBP135 (approx. 200 USD), following the 200 USD threshold recommended by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The UK has not changed its de minimis threshold since departing the EU and has not stated plans to deviate from the £135 threshold.

The UK has robust consumer protection laws, as laid out in the Consumer Rights Act 2015. The rights enumerated in the 2015 legislation, which include standards for considering goods faulty, unfair contract terms, right to repair, and right to return, apply to both in-person and online transactions. The UK also applies the UK eIDAS Regulations, which "set out rules for UK trust services and establishes a legal framework for the provision and effect of electronic signatures, electronic seals, electronic time stamps, electronic documents, electronic registered delivery services and certificate services for website authentication."