Art. 40 of the Organic Communications Law provides that for the granting and renewal of licenses for the provision of telecom services, the Agency on Telecommunication Regulation and Control (Agencia de Regulación y Control de las Telecomunicaciones, ARCOTEL) will consider the need to address: technological development, market evolution, the National Telecommunications Plan, the needs for the sustained development of the sector and of the State and universal access to information and communication technologies, as well as the effective satisfaction of the public or general interest.
Art. 40 also establishes that in the case of applications for the granting of new licenses, it must be evaluated whether any company or group of companies related to the applicant of the license provides the same service or similar services and the effects that the granting of the new license required could have on the market. For this purpose, a sworn statement must be submitted. In this regard, Art. 24 of the Telecommunications and Frequencies Enabling Titles Regulation provides that no license for the rendering of telecommunications services shall be granted to natural or juridical persons who have a valid license for the rendering of the same service of the general telecommunications regime, without prejudice to the application of the criteria set forth in Art. 40 of the Organic Law of Telecommunications.

Ecuador has not appended the World Trade Organization (WTO) Telecom Reference Paper to its schedule of commitments.

Ecuador maintains a telecommunications regulatory authority, the Agency for the Regulation of Telecommunications (ARCOTEL). However, reports indicate that the decision-making processes of this body are not entirely independent from governmental influence. Established under Art. 142 of the 2015 Organic Law of Telecommunications, ARCOTEL is institutionally linked to the Ministry of Telecommunications and the Information Society (MINTEL). According to Arts. 145 and 146.8, the board of directors of ARCOTEL, which is responsible for appointing its executive director, is composed of the Minister of Telecommunications, the Secretary of Planning, and a representative designated by the President of the Republic. This governance structure may compromise the agency’s institutional independence.

Chapter IX of the Organic Law on the Protection of Personal Data stipulates that personal data may be transferred internationally provided that adequate levels of protection are ensured. In instances where the international transfer does not guarantee such protection, the transfer may nevertheless proceed if the data controller or processor offer appropriate safeguards for the data subject. In addition, entities responsible for the processing of personal data may submit binding corporate rules to the Personal Data Protection Authority for approval. In all other cases not covered by the aforementioned provisions, transfers can occur with prior authorisation from the Authority or in other limited circumstances, including where the data subject has provided their explicit consent.
Chapter XII of the Regulation of the Organic Law on the Protection of Personal Data further elaborates on these requirements.

Art. 10.11.2 of the Economic Complementation Agreement No. 75 between the Republic of Chile and the Republic of Ecuador provides that each Party shall permit the cross-border transfer of information by electronic means, including personal information, where such activity is for the conduct of the business of a person of a Party. In addition, Art. 10.12.2 states that a Party may not require a person of the other Party to use or locate computer facilities in the territory of that Party as a condition of doing business in that territory.

The Organic Law on the Protection of Personal Data establishes a comprehensive framework for data protection in Ecuador. The Ecuadorian Data Protection Superintendency (SPDP) serves as the regulatory authority under this Law. In addition, several sector-specific legal instruments govern data protection within particular domains, including the labour, telecommunications, and financial sectors.

Ecuador is a party to the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).

Ecuador is not a signatory of the 1996 World Trade Organization (WTO) Information Technology Agreement (ITA) nor the 2015 expansion (ITA II).

Art. 25.2 of the Organic Law on the National System of Public Procurement stipulates that, for the acquisition of goods and services not classified as of Ecuadorian origin under the relevant regulations, prior verification of the absence of Ecuadorian-origin offers shall be required. Such verification must be carried out through expeditious mechanisms that do not hinder the contracting process.

Art. 37 of the Organic Law on the National System of Public Procurement provides that the participation of foreign consultants in public procurement procedures, whether natural or legal persons, is limited to services, fields, activities, or areas in which there is, either partially or wholly, no domestic technical capacity or experience, as certified by the National Public Procurement Service, which must issue a public notice inviting expressions of interest from national suppliers. Where, within eight days, no domestic providers express interest, or those that do fail to meet the required technical capacity or experience, the contracting authority may authorise the participation of foreign consultancy service providers. Art. 39 further provides that foreign legal entities must be domiciled in Ecuador in order to execute public contracts, and that foreign companies registered as consultants in the Unified Registry of Suppliers (RUP) may not engage in any activity other than consultancy services within the scope of their registration; in all cases, preference is given to the engagement of Ecuadorian professionals.

Ministerial Agreement No. 141 requires public entities to procure telecommunications services exclusively from State‑owned providers. Art. 1 requires that public‑sector bodies contract services such as fixed telephony, advanced mobile services, data links, internet services, and other related telecommunications services through public telecommunications enterprises. Art. 2 permits procurement from private providers only where public telecommunications enterprises are unable, for duly justified technical reasons, to meet the required specifications. Art. 3 extends these obligations to the acquisition of emerging digital technologies, including big data, the Internet of Things, blockchain, cloud computing, hosting, artificial intelligence, virtual reality, and comparable technologies. It is reported that, pursuant to this framework, customers seeking to contract cloud service providers that rely on data centres located outside Ecuador must do so through the National Telecommunications Corporation (CNT), a State‑owned entity that acts as the mandated local partner.

Art. 148 of the Organic Code on the Social Economy of Knowledge, Creativity and Innovation establishes a mandatory hierarchy for software procurement in the public sector, requiring contracting entities to prioritise: (1) open‑source software that includes source‑code development, parametrisation or implementation services with a significant component of Ecuadorian added value; (2) software in any other modality that incorporates services with a majority Ecuadorian added‑value component; (3) open‑source software that does not include a majority component of Ecuadorian added‑value services; (4) international software supplied through national providers; and (5) international software supplied through foreign providers. Where a public body is unable to acquire or develop open‑source software with services that include a significant component of Ecuadorian added value, it must justify the procurement of alternative technologies before the electronic government regulatory authority designated by the President of the Republic. Furthermore, when non‑free technologies are procured, the acquiring institution must submit, within 180 days, a feasibility plan for migration to free digital technologies; if migration is feasible, implementation must occur within a maximum period of five years, and if not, the competent authority must undertake periodic evaluations in accordance with applicable regulations. Decree No. 1073 provides further details concerning this prescribed order of preference in governmental software procurement.

Art. 25.1 of the Organic Law on National System of Public Procurement stipulates that the tender documents shall include evaluation criteria designed to encourage and promote local and national participation, as well as women’s entrepreneurship in all its diversity, by establishing a margin of preference for providers of works, goods and services, including consultancy services, of local and national origin. Art. 25.2 also provides that preference shall be granted to suppliers of goods, works, or services that incorporate a greater proportion of Ecuadorian origin, as well as to actors within the popular and solidarity economy, artisans, small producers, microenterprises, small enterprises, family farming units, and entrepreneurial initiatives led by women in all their diversity. Such preference shall be implemented through mechanisms including, but not limited to, proportionate preference margins, market reservation in the context of inclusive fairs, advance payments, and preferential subcontracting. The preferential measures shall follow this order of precedence: first, organisations of the popular and solidarity economy, artisans, small producers, microenterprises, small enterprises, family farming units, and women-led entrepreneurial initiatives; and second, medium-sized enterprises.
In addition, Art. 25.4 provides that priority shall be given to nationally produced goods, works and services, particularly those originating from the popular and solidarity-based economy and from micro, small and medium productive units, in all public procurement procedures, with preferential margins but without market reservations.

It is reported that government procurement in Ecuador is frequently cumbersome, insufficiently transparent, and vulnerable to corruption. Public institutions are said to delay payments without providing justification, even when goods and services have been satisfactorily delivered and supported by appropriate work orders and receipts. This lack of transparency creates a risk that procuring entities may conduct procurement procedures in a manner that favours a preferred supplier.