Foreign investments are subject to approval and generally allowed, such as in SoftBank's 2013 acquisition of Sprint, unless contrary to national interest. The review of the Committee on Foreign Investment on National Security considerations applies to controlling investments in US businesses (but does not apply to greenfield investments). Additionally, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) seeks to identify and address any national security risk that arises as a result of a covered transaction and can request that the President determines whether to suspend or prohibit a covered transaction or take other action. This has occurred in at least five cases, such as the 2007 push by Huawei and Bain Capital to acquire an ownership interest in 3Com; Bain Capital ultimately abandoned the deal once CFIUS declared its intention to ask the President to halt the acquisition. There are several restrictions which can apply on cross-border mergers and acquisitions that are above general restrictions for competition reasons.
The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) serves to strengthen and modernize the CFIUS, broadening its mandate and the executive powers of the President in order to ensure both can step in and screen any potential investments and transactions along national security lines. Amendments to FIRRMA since then have focused on clarifying language and providing for exemption status when dealing with certain countries (particularly those with whom the US maintains a free trade agreement, such as Australia or Canada).

Section 310(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 states that a foreign government or representative may not directly hold a spectrum license, while Section 310(b) states that foreign individuals and business entities may not directly hold any common carrier and broadcast licenses. Under 310(b)(3), a foreign entity is limited to a 20% ownership interest in any common carrier and broadcast licenses. Pursuant to Section 310(b)(4), a foreign entity is limited to a 25% ownership interest in a US corporation that controls any common carrier, and broadcast license. The Federal Communications Commission has the discretion to allow foreign ownership in excess of 25% unless such ownership is inconsistent with the public interest.

Although the US is a signatory to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), its coverage schedules do not fully cover the three most relevant services sectors (CPC 752, 754, 84). While value-added telecommunications services are covered, the agreement does not cover procurement of public utility services including telecommunications and automatic data processing (ADP)-related telecommunications services.

Under the Trade Agreements Act (TAA), if the acquisition value of the tender is above a certain purchasing threshold (usually USD 200,000, although sometimes lower), US suppliers must turn to either domestic producers or countries with which the US maintains a free trade agreement (FTA). The TAA opens procurement markets only for products from the US or these so-called “designated countries” and prohibits procurement of end products from non-designated countries (e.g. China, India, Indonesia, Thailand). The purchasing threshold that needs to be reached to involve the TAA depends on the FTA in question, and is updated every two years.

The James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act imposes a 2% tax on foreign procurement of goods and services by the Federal government, under Section 5000C(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. The tax applies to procurements from "any country which is not a party to an international procurement agreement with the United States." Therefore, there are exemptions for FTAs partners of the United States and signatories of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement.

A provision in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (H.R.933), which President Obama signed into law in March 2013, bars the departments of Commerce and Justice, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Science Foundation from procuring any information technology (IT) systems that are produced, manufactured, or assembled by any company owned, directed, or subsidized by the People’s Republic of China, unless the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has completed an assessment of the security risk of cyber espionage or sabotage associated with the system to the United States.

The US Department of State has decided not to use Lenovo Group Ltd. computers on a classified network, under fears that hardware-level backdoors could exist in these products. Lenovo hardware is also reportedly banned from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), although no evidence of any wrongdoing on the part of Lenovo has been presented.

After House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence’s 2012 report, the United States enacted several laws (beginning with the Consolidated and Further Appropriations Act, 2013) that restrict federal procurement of, and grant and loan spending on, Huawei systems. Although the 2013 Appropriations Act does not name Huawei, some observers and Members of Congress described it as designed to address risks posed by Huawei and ZTE.
In the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018, the United States placed Huawei-related restrictions into federal law beyond the appropriations context. The 2018 NDAA prohibits Department of Defense (DOD) from procuring certain telecommunications equipment or services from Huawei and others as part of DOD’s missions related to nuclear deterrence and homeland defense. Unlike earlier appropriations provisions, the 2018 NDAA names Huawei in the legislation. The 2018 NDAA prohibits DOD from procuring, obtaining, extending, or renewing contracts that include telecommunications equipment or services provided by Huawei, ZTE, or any entity that the Secretary of Defense reasonably believes is owned, controlled by, or “otherwise connected to” the Chinese or Russian governments. To fall within the 2018 NDAA, the telecommunications equipment or services must be a substantial or essential component or critical technology of the system provided to DOD for its nuclear deterrence or homeland defense missions.
The John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 provides a broader set of Huawei-related restrictions that apply across the executive branch. It restricts [Section 889(a)(1)(A)] executive agencies from procuring systems that contain Huawei equipment or services and prohibits [Section 889(a)(1)(B)] executive agencies from contracting with companies that use Huawei equipment or services in the companies’ own systems—even if those systems are not sold to the government. The Joe Biden administration has stepped up restrictions on Huawei and ZTE, citing national security concerns.

In March 2003, the United States authorities imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty imports of silicon metal (HS Code: 280469) from Russia, which is used also for producing silicon compounds as well as silicon wafers used as electronic semiconductors. This measure was last extended in June 2020. The rate of duty on imports from Russia is 79.42% for all companies, with the exceptions of Russian ZAO Kremny/Sual-Kremny-Ural Ltd that get a 56.11% duty.

In July 2020, the United States initiated an anti-subsidy investigation on imports of of silicon metal (HS Code: 280469) from Kazakhstan, which is used also for producing silicon compounds as well as silicon wafers used as electronic semiconductors. In April 2021, the United States imposed a definitive countervailing duty with a rate of 160%.

In October 2008, the United States authorities imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on import of electrolytic manganese dioxide (HS Code: 282010), which is the critical component of the cathode material in modern alkaline, lithium, and sodium batteries including electrochemical capacitors and hydrogen production. The duty applies to imports from Chinese firms, most notably Guizhou Redstar Developing Import and Export Company, Ltd. This measure was extended in January 2015, and subsequently, in July 2020. The rate of duty on imports from China is 149.92%.

In June 1991, the United States authorities imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty imports of silicon metal (HS Code: 280469) from China, which is used also for producing silicon compounds as well as silicon wafers used as electronic semiconductors. This measure was last extended in June 2018. The rate of duty on imports from China is 139.49%.

The US is a signatory of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Information Technology Agreement (ITA) of 1996 and its 2015 expansion (ITA II).

Thailand has adopted national legislation based on or influenced by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Electronic Signatures.