The Myanmar Printing and Publishing Law created the licensing regime for publishing houses, news agencies, and websites, and these outlets must register prior to producing content, including for publishing online.

The indicator "6.2.4 - Government Internet shut down in practice" of the V-Dem Dataset, which measures whether the government has the technical capacity to actively make internet service cease, thus interrupting domestic access to the internet or whether the government has decided to do so, has a score of 1 in Myanmar. This corresponds to "The government shut down domestic access to the Internet numerous times this year."

It is reported that since the military coup in February 2021, the government of Myanmar has repeatedly shut down internet services nationwide. The internet shutdown came in various forms: i) the nationwide cut-off of mobile data and fixed-line internet access; ii) nightly shutdowns affecting fixed-line (fiber-optic and cable) connectivity. Although the internet was on during the day in this period, users reported frequent short-term outages and slow speeds nationwide; iii) shut down public Wi-Fi connections; iv) shut down wireless broadband internet services indefinitely. Under orders from the military-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Transport and Communications has significant powers to cut off the internet without oversight or safeguards, as it controls much of the telecommunications infrastructure via the state-owned company Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications.

It is reported that the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MoTC) issued a series of directives ordering internet providers to block more than 2,170 websites in March, May, and August 2020. Some included local news outlets and websites such as Narinjara News, Mandalay In-Depth News, Mekong News, and Voice of Myanmar, among others. In 2021, it has also been reported that the government of Myanmar banned virtual private networks (VPNs). In addition, in February 2021, the MoTC ordered all ISPs, mobile service providers, and international gateway managers to block access to Facebook and WhatsApp. On 5 February 2021, orders to block Twitter and Instagram followed. While WhatsApp and Instagram were included on a list of approved sites on 25 May 2021, Facebook and Twitter remain blocked. Other secretive blocks on websites have reportedly been ordered since the military coup, affecting popular platforms such as Wikipedia as well as national media outlets.

A basic legal framework on intermediary liability beyond copyright infringement is absent in Myanmar's law and jurisprudence. It is reported that the Telecommunication Law does not explicitly hold intermediaries liable for the content, but it is reported that some provisions are vague and could feasibly be interpreted to justify-content removals.

It is reported that Myanmar imposes an identity requirement for SIM registration. Anyone wanting to purchase a SIM card has to provide their national ID card, or a passport in case of foreigners, to activate a new prepaid SIM card.

A basic legal framework on intermediary liability for copyright infringement is absent in Myanmar's law and jurisprudence. It is reported that the Telecommunication Law does not explicitly hold intermediaries liable for the content, but it is reported that some provisions are vague and could feasibly be interpreted to justify-content removals.

Art. 4 of the Electronic Transactions Law allows the Government to obtain personal data for purposes related to the stability, tranquility, and national security of the State. The regulation fails to specify what information constitutes the general terms such as national security.

Section 8 of the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens, suspended in light of the state of emergency in Myanmar, enables public authorities or law enforcement to access personal data held by private organisations. It prohibits the interception of personal communications without a warrant, but it contains a vague exception allowing surveillance if permission is granted by the president or a government body.

Arts. 75 and 77 of the Telecommunication Law allow the government to intercept, suspend, or obtain any information that threatens national security and the rule of law in the country. The broad provision fails to specify which government agents are authorized to do this and what sort of information specifically constitutes the general terms such as national security.

Myanmar does not have a comprehensive regime in place for all personal data. However, the Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens set out provisions for the protection of privacy and security of communications. These are supplemented by sectoral legislation, such as the Telecommunications Law 2013, which contains provisions related to the confidentiality of personal information.

Art. 27 of the Electronic Transactions Law mandates the personal data administrator to keep personal data for a certain period before destroying them. However, the regulation does not specify the duration for personal data administrators to keep the data.

Myanmar has not joined any agreement with binding commitments to open transfers of data across borders.

Section 27-A(ii) of the Electronic Transactions Law, as amended in 2021 by Law No. 7/2021, mandates the personal data administrator to seek the consent of the owner of data before any data transfer. However, the Law does not further regulate the ways to seek the owner's consent.

Myanmar has a telecommunications authority: The Posts and Telecommunications Department (Department) under the Ministry of Transport and Communications. However, it is reported that the decision making process of this entity is not fully independent from the government.