According to Art. 9.1 of the Regulations for Licensing of Telecommunications and Information Technology Equipment, any party wishing to import telecommunications and IT equipment, that is in the list of restricted goods, shall apply for Customs Clearance Permission from the Communications, Space, and Technology Commission (CST). The list of restricted goods and their tariff codes can be found at Zakat, Tax and Customs Authority website, however, this is not accessible. It is reported that restricted products include wireless products, satellite internet services, equipment transmitting pictures wirelessly, and pre-paid telephone recharging cards.

Saudi Arabia restricted the import of certain products by requiring permission from the General Commission for Audiovisual Media (GCAM). These include any audio/video content on transportable media, tapes, disks, storage equipment, and audio/video broadcasting and receiving equipment through any communication utility (cable, land or other communication networks).

It is reported that individuals are required to use their legal names when signing mobile-service contracts and must provide a national identification card or residence permit. Moreover, Since 2016 the Communications, Space & Technology Commission (CST), mobile service providers to register the fingerprints of new SIM-card subscribers within 90 days. The collected information is subsequently shared with a centralised database managed by the Ministry of the Interior.

Saudi authorities are reported to regularly block access to news outlets and other websites based on geopolitical and domestic political considerations. While widely used social media and communication applications are not consistently blocked, some users have reported that Clubhouse is inaccessible, despite the absence of an official government statement confirming its restriction. Furthermore, regulators and telecommunications operators have historically taken a restrictive stance toward free or low-cost Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services. These services are perceived as undermining traditional mobile call revenues, circumventing existing regulatory frameworks, and potentially evading surveillance mechanisms. In this context, the Communications, Space, and Technology Commission (CST) and domestic ISPs have previously blocked applications such as Viber, WhatsApp, and FaceTime, as well as integrated messaging features on platforms like Facebook Messenger. As of June 2024, most VoIP applications were accessible in Saudi Arabia, with the exception of WhatsApp, which reportedly remains restricted.
Moreover, between 2017 and 2024, websites affiliated with Qatari, Iranian, and Turkish media were intermittently blocked in the context of ongoing regional tensions. Platforms critical of the Saudi government—such as al-Manar, the Beirut-based broadcaster—have also been subject to restrictions. According to available reports, internet service providers (ISPs) in the Kingdom have deployed WireFilter censorship technology to target specific web pages.

The indicator "7.2.4 - Government Internet shut down in practice" of the V-Dem Dataset, which measures whether the government has the technical capacity to actively make internet service cease, thus interrupting domestic access to the internet or whether the government has decided to do so, has a score of 3 in Saudi Arabia for the year 2024. This corresponds to "Rarely but there have been a few occasions throughout the year when the government shut down domestic access to Internet."
Although Saudi Arabia was identified as a 'repeat offender' for implementing internet shutdowns in 2023, a practice it has consistently maintained since 2016, and was among the MENA countries enforcing such measures during that year, reports indicate that the country carried out one internet shutdown in 2024.

Art. 56 of the Implementing Regulations of the Income Tax Law requires that a taxpayer's books be kept in Saudi Arabia.

Art. 29.1 of Saudi Arabia’s Personal Data Protection Law (PDPL) and Art. 2 of the Regulation on Personal Data Transfer Outside the Kingdom permit controllers to transfer or disclose personal data abroad where a legitimate purpose exists, such as fulfilling obligations under agreements to which the Kingdom is a party, serving national interests, performing contractual obligations involving the data subject, enabling centralised processing for operational purposes, providing a service or benefit to the data subject, or conducting scientific research and studies. In addition to fulfilling these purposes, Art. 29.2 of the PDPL requires that transfers neither compromise national security nor vital interests, occur only to jurisdictions offering protection equivalent to Saudi standards as assessed by the Saudi Data and Artificial Intelligence Authority (SDAIA), and involve only the minimum necessary data. These conditions do not apply in cases of extreme necessity, such as safeguarding life or preventing or treating infectious diseases (Art. 29.3). Where no adequacy decision or international agreement exists, Art. 4 of the Regulations mandates appropriate safeguards, including SDAIA-issued Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs), Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs) for multinational groups, or certification by an SDAIA-licensed entity. Exemptions from adequacy and data minimisation requirements may apply in specific cases, such as transfers between public bodies under agreements serving national interests, occasional or time-limited transfers involving few data subjects, intra-group transfers for central operations, transfers to provide a direct benefit to the data subject without violating expectations, and transfers for scientific research, provided that safeguards such as SCCs, BCRs, or certification are implemented and sensitive data is excluded where required.

Section 3-3-8 of the Cloud Computing Services Provisioning Regulations stipulates that cloud service providers must notify their subscribers and obtain their consent if their content is transferred outside Saudi Arabia. This iteration represents the fourth version of the legislation. The previous three versions were referred to as the Cloud Computing Regulatory Framework. Since its inception, the legislation has included similar requirements. Section 3.3.11 of both the first and second versions mandated that cloud service providers inform their customers in advance if their content would be transferred, stored, or processed outside the Kingdom, whether permanently or temporarily. In the third version, Section 3-3-10 required that cloud service providers clearly inform both the Commission and the subscriber in advance and obtain their approval if the subscriber's content would be transferred abroad.

Saudi Arabia has not joined any agreement with binding commitments to open transfers of data across borders.

The Personal Data Protection Law (PDPL) establishes a comprehensive data protection regime in Saudi Arabia. The PDPL applies to any processing of personal data carried out in Saudi Arabia by companies or public entities by any means, including the processing of personal data of Saudi residents by entities located outside the Kingdom. Furthermore, the second clause of the law establishes the Saudi Data & Artificial Intelligence Authority (SDAIA) as the competent authority to supervise the implementation of the provisions of the system and its regulations. However, a transfer of supervision to the National Data Management Office (NDMO) will be considered in the future.

Art. 7 of the Internet of Things (IoT) Regulatory Framework requires that IoT service providers must provide the technical capabilities in the IoT devices and machines to save and maintain the data to make it possible to be reviewed for a duration not less than 12 months or any other duration specified by the Communications, Space & Technology Commission (CST). This requirement is not included in the in force IoT Regulatory Framework of 2024.

Pursuant to Art. 31 of the Personal Data Protection Law, the Controller must maintain records of personal data processing activities, in a manner appropriate to the nature of its operations, and make such records available to the competent authority upon request. Art. 33 of the Implementing Regulation further specifies this obligation, requiring the Controller to retain these records for the entire duration of the processing and for an additional five years following the end of any personal data processing activity.

According to Art. 5.2 of the General Principles for Personal Data Protection in the Telecommunication, IT, and Postal Services, service providers in certain sectors, including telecom and IT, are mandated to assign the role and responsibilities of customers’ personal data protection to an independent function, which can be intended as a data protection officer.

The Personal Data Protection Law mandates data privacy impact assessments whereby controllers must conduct an evaluation of the effects of processing associated with any product or service provided to the public.

Arts. 6, 10, and 15 of the Personal Data Protection Law delineate the circumstances under which a public entity may request access to data: namely, for purposes of public interest, security, implementing another law, or fulfilling judicial requirements. Notably, there is no stipulation requiring the presence of a court order or warrant. However, Art. 21 of the Implementing Regulations imposes additional obligations on public entities that process personal data obtained indirectly from data subjects for public interest purposes. These obligations include ensuring that the processing is necessary to achieve a clearly defined public interest, that such interest is related to a mandate specified by law, and that appropriate measures are taken to mitigate any potential harm resulting from the processing.