It is reported that foreign communications infrastructure providers have been asked to sign Network Security Agreements (NSAs) in order to operate in the US. These agreements ensure that U.S. government agencies have the ability to access communications data when legally requested, often through a National Security Letter (NSL). NSLs do not require prior approval from a judge. The data in question can include call-identifying information, user location, call duration, start time, end time, IP addresses, location information, URLs, etc., and must be reported to the federal Department in question within five business days following request.

It is reported that there is an obligation for passive infrastructure sharing in the country to deliver telecom services to end users. It is practised in both the mobile and fixed sectors based on commercial agreements.

It is reported that the U.S. does not mandate functional separation for operators with significant market power (SMP) in the telecom market. However, accounting separation is required by law.

It is reported that entities intending to offer telecommunications services between the United States and any foreign destination are required to apply for, and obtain, an international Section 214 authorisation from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934, prior to initiating service. The approval of licence assignment applications may occur as swiftly as overnight or may extend over several months, depending on various factors, including the involvement of foreign ownership. Although the FCC has established detailed licensing timelines, including a 14-day streamlined review process for the majority of international Section 214 applications, this expedited procedure is typically suspended in cases where aggregate foreign ownership exceeds 10%. In such instances, the FCC refers the application to the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector (commonly referred to as Team Telecom), which conducts potentially protracted national security reviews.

Under Section 310(b) of the Communications Act, prior approval from the Federal Communications Commission, which is generally granted upon application, is needed for common carrier wireless licensees to have direct foreign ownership of no more than 20% and indirect foreign ownership of no more than 25%.

Section 1.50002 of the Commission's rules mandates that the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau publish a "Covered List" of communications equipment and services deemed to pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security or the safety of U.S. persons. This designation is based on specific sources of risk assessment. Telecommunications providers in the U.S. are required to remove any equipment or services from companies on this list from their networks and are prohibited from using Federal Communications Commission (FCC) funds to acquire such equipment or services. The Covered List includes several foreign companies, such as Huawei, ZTE, Hytera Communications, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology, Dahua Technology, AO Kaspersky Lab, China Mobile International USA, China Telecom (Americas) Corp, Pacific Networks Corp, and China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited.

The United States has appended the World Trade Organization (WTO) Telecom Reference Paper to its schedule of commitments.

The United States is a party to the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).

Fair use is codified in Section 107 of the Copyright Act, which states that the fair use of a work for purposes such as criticism, commentary, news reporting, teaching (including the reproduction of multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research does not constitute an infringement of copyright. To determine whether a particular use qualifies as fair use, the statute requires consideration of four principal factors: the purpose and character of the use, including whether it is of a commercial nature or intended for non-profit educational purposes; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the work as a whole; and the effect of the use on the potential market for, or value of, the original work.

Based on 2024 data, the United States ranks first in global digital piracy traffic, accounting for 12.3% of all visits to piracy-related platforms. This includes activity across television, publishing, film, software, and music. The US has been among the top countries involved in digital piracy in recent years.

The US has ratified the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty.

The US has ratified the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Performances and Phonograms Treaty.

The Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) provides a framework for the effective protection of trade secrets by establishing a federal claim for misappropriation of trade secrets. Until the adoption of the DTSA, trade secrets had been protected at the state level, with all states, other than New York, adopting their own version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA). States adopting the UTSA impose liability for improper acquisition of trade secrets; use or disclosure of a trade secret is not required for liability, though additional damages may accrue. On the other hand, States (New York) adopting the Restatement of Torts (Section 757) approach require unauthorised use or disclosure for liability to accrue.

In June 2023, the U.S. Federal Government issued the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) clause, FAR 52.204-27, implementing the No TikTok on Government Devices Act. This clause prohibits the presence or use of the TikTok application on IT equipment used by government contractors and their personnel during the performance of a federal contract. The measure was introduced to protect government information in response to national security concerns. The regulation took effect immediately and applies to all new government contracts, including those that fall below the simplified acquisition threshold, as well as contracts for commercial products and commercial services.
It is reported that certain related restrictions apply since January 2020, when the United States Army and Navy banned TikTok from government devices following the Defense Department's designation of the app as a security risk. A Navy bulletin posted on a Facebook page for military personnel warned that users of government-issued mobile devices who did not remove TikTok would be blocked from accessing the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet.

After the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence’s 2012 report, the United States enacted several laws (beginning with the Consolidated and Further Appropriations Act, 2013) that restrict federal procurement of and grant and loan spending on Huawei systems. Although the 2013 Appropriations Act does not name Huawei, some observers and Members of Congress described it as designed to address risks posed by Huawei and ZTE.
In the National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018, the United States placed Huawei-related restrictions into federal law beyond the context of appropriations. The 2018 NDAA prohibits the Department of Defence (DOD) from procuring certain telecommunications equipment or services from Huawei and others as part of the DOD’s missions related to nuclear deterrence and homeland defence. Unlike earlier appropriations provisions, the 2018 NDAA names Huawei in the legislation. The 2018 NDAA prohibits DOD from procuring, obtaining, extending, or renewing contracts that include telecommunications equipment or services provided by Huawei, ZTE, or any entity that the Secretary of Defence reasonably believes is owned, controlled by, or “otherwise connected to” the Chinese or Russian governments. To fall within the 2018 NDAA, the telecommunications equipment or services must be a substantial or essential component or critical technology of the system provided to the DOD for its nuclear deterrence or homeland defence missions.
The John S. McCain National Defence Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 2019 provides a broader set of Huawei-related restrictions that apply across the executive branch. It restricts [Section 889(a)(1)(A)] executive agencies from procuring systems that contain Huawei equipment or services and prohibits [Section 889(a)(1)(B)] executive agencies from contracting with companies that use Huawei equipment or services in the companies’ own systems—even if those systems are not sold to the government. The Joe Biden administration has stepped up restrictions on Huawei and ZTE, citing national security concerns.