Art. 6 of the "Administrative Provisions on Foreign‑funded Telecommunications Enterprises" stipulates that, unless otherwise prescribed by the State, the aggregate equity held by foreign investor(s) in a foreign‑funded telecommunications enterprise engaged in basic telecommunications services, excluding radio paging services, may not ultimately exceed 49%, and the "Classification Catalogue of Telecommunications Services" identifies all categories of basic telecommunications services that fall within the scope of this restriction.

It is reported that the government holds equity stakes in several telecommunications enterprises. In particular, state ownership represents 75.15% of shares in China Telecom, 70.42% in China Mobile, 51.7% in China Unicom, and 100% in China Broadnet.

It is reported that China does not mandate functional or accounting separation for operators with significant market power (SMP) in the telecom market.

Pursuant to Art. 7 of the Telecommunications Regulations, the State is required to implement a licensing regime for telecommunications enterprises in accordance with the categorisation of telecommunications services, which, as set out in the Appendix to the Regulations, includes basic telecommunications services. Art. 5.6 of the Administrative Measures on Telecommunications Business Permits further provides that the minimum registered capital for an operator conducting business within a single province, autonomous region, or centrally administered municipality is RMB 100 million (approx. USD 14.5 million), whereas operators providing services nationwide or across multiple such jurisdictions must have a minimum registered capital of RMB 1 billion (approx. USD 145 million). Under Art. 8 of the Telecommunications Regulations, basic telecommunications services are defined as the provision of public network infrastructure, public data transmission services, and basic voice communication services. It is reported that China’s restrictions on basic telecommunications services, including for example the imposition of very high capital requirements, have hindered foreign suppliers from entering the country’s basic telecommunications market.

Arts. 8 and 9 of the "Provisional Regulation of the People’s Republic of China for the Administration of International Networking of Computer Information Networks" require access entities to obtain a licence prior to engaging in either operational or non-operational activities involving international networking, which, under Art. 3, is defined as the connection of domestic computer information networks with foreign networks for the purpose of international information exchange. Art. 6 additionally mandates that any computer information network directly engaging in international networking must rely solely on the international inbound and outbound channels provided by the national public telecommunications network; no entity or individual is permitted to establish independent channels or to utilise any alternative channels for international connectivity.

China has appended the World Trade Organization (WTO) Telecom Reference Paper to its schedule of commitments.

The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) acts as the telecommunications authority in the country, and therefore, there is no independence from the government in its decision-making process.

The "Notice of the People's Bank of China on Protecting Personal Financial Information by Banking Financial Institutions" states that the processing of personal information collected by commercial banks must be stored, handled and analysed within the territory of China, and such personal information is not allowed to be transferred overseas (paragraph 6).
The Personal Financial Information Protection Technical Specification (PFI Specification) regulates “any personal information collected, processed and stored by Financial Institutions during the provision of financial products and services" (PFI). The PFI specification requires that PFI collected or generated in mainland China is stored, processed and analysed within the territory. Further, under the PFI Specification, where there is a business need for cross-border transfer of personal financial information (PFI) and the financial institution obtains explicit consent to the transfer from the personal financial information subjects (i.e. the persons under the PFI Specification providing the data), conducts a security assessment and then supervises the offshore recipient to ensure responsible processing, storage and deletion of PFI (Section 7.1.3).

Art. 10 of the Government Procurement Law stipulates that government procurement should prioritise domestic goods, construction works, and services, except where such items are unavailable within China or cannot be obtained there on reasonable commercial terms, where they are intended for use outside China, or where other laws or administrative regulations provide otherwise. It is reported that, under both its government procurement framework and its tendering and bidding regime, China continues to implement policies that favour products, services, and technologies produced or developed by Chinese‑owned and Chinese‑controlled enterprises, through both explicit and implicit requirements that impede fair competition by foreign firms. In practice, foreign companies frequently report that tender documentation requires “domestic brands” or “indigenous designs”, and, in the absence of clear and authoritative rules defining what constitutes a “domestic product”, procurement officials tend to adopt a cautious approach by preferentially sourcing from domestic Chinese enterprises.

China is a party to the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).

A report by the National Development and Reform Commission of China and the Ministry of Finance bans the purchase of certain foreign IT products for selected government procurement lists. For example, one government procurement list banned ten Apple Inc. products, including the iPad, iPad Mini, MacBook Air and MacBook Pro.
A separate procurement list includes some Apple computers that departments can continue to buy on a smaller scale, i.e. purchases totalling less than 1.2 million yuan (USD 195,000). Products from Dell Inc., Hewlett-Packard Co. and Chinese maker Lenovo Group Ltd. were included on both lists. This ban applies to all central Communist Party departments, government ministries and local governments.

China has a copyright regime under the Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China. However, the exceptions do not follow the fair use or fair dealing model, therefore limiting the lawful use of copyrighted work by others. Art. 22 lists the exceptions, which include: the use of a published work for the purposes of the user's own private study, research or self-entertainment; and the use of a published work, within proper scope, by a State organ for the purpose of fulfilling its official duties; among others.

In June 2014, the Centre of Public Procurement of the Central Government issued the result of the public tender for central government procurement of electronic information products of 2014 (Vol. 21, GC-HJ140283). Under the "Antivirus Software" category, all foreign security providers such as Kaspersky and Symantec were excluded from the list. Only five Chinese providers, i.e. 360, Jiangmin, Rising, Kingsoft, and KILL, are listed for national security consideration.

It is reported that concerns regarding online piracy in China persist, with rights holders continuing to emphasise the need for effective enforcement and clearer delineation of criminal liability for the manufacture, distribution, and export of circumvention devices, as well as for the adoption of additional measures to address online piracy.

It is reported that stakeholders have expressed concern about a confidential 2022 document issued by the State‑owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), known as Document 79, which is understood to set out a phased requirement for the exclusive adoption of “secure and controllable” ICT products across the information systems of the Chinese Government, the Chinese Communist Party and state‑owned enterprises. According to these reports, most government institutions in China are now procuring domestic technologies in preference to foreign solutions, even when the latter may be technologically superior, covering both hardware and software. If fully implemented, Document 79 would result in all governmental entities relying solely on domestic technology by 2027. It is further reported that China has invoked similar “secure and controllable” requirements in various regulatory measures since 2013, some of which have compelled the transfer or disclosure of source code or other forms of intellectual property.