In June 2014, the Centre of Public Procurement of the Central Government issued the result of the public tender for central government procurement of electronic information products of 2014 (Vol. 21, GC-HJ140283). Under the "Antivirus Software" category, all foreign security providers such as Kaspersky and Symantec were excluded from the list. Only five Chinese providers, i.e. 360, Jiangmin, Rising, Kingsoft, and KILL, are listed for national security consideration.

It is reported that concerns regarding online piracy in China persist, with rights holders continuing to emphasise the need for effective enforcement and clearer delineation of criminal liability for the manufacture, distribution, and export of circumvention devices, as well as for the adoption of additional measures to address online piracy.

It is reported that stakeholders have expressed concern about a confidential 2022 document issued by the State‑owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), known as Document 79, which is understood to set out a phased requirement for the exclusive adoption of “secure and controllable” ICT products across the information systems of the Chinese Government, the Chinese Communist Party and state‑owned enterprises. According to these reports, most government institutions in China are now procuring domestic technologies in preference to foreign solutions, even when the latter may be technologically superior, covering both hardware and software. If fully implemented, Document 79 would result in all governmental entities relying solely on domestic technology by 2027. It is further reported that China has invoked similar “secure and controllable” requirements in various regulatory measures since 2013, some of which have compelled the transfer or disclosure of source code or other forms of intellectual property.

According to Art. 9 of the Government Procurement Law, government procurement must facilitate the achievement of China's policies for economic and social development, including but not limited to environmental protection, assistance to underdeveloped or ethnic minority areas, and the promotion of SMEs.
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) has issued a Notification on Further Supporting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) in Public Procurement (MOF Announcement No. 19) in response to the State Council's Notification on a Package of Policy Measures to Stabilize the Economy (Guo Fa 2022 No.12). This announcement outlines three primary directives for relevant procuring entities: (i) strict implementation of public procurement policies supporting SMEs; (ii) enhancement of price preferences for SMEs; (iii) augmentation of the proportion of reserves allocated for SMEs.
Furthermore, MOF Announcement No. 19 introduces significant modifications to the preferential treatment of SMEs in public procurement. The price deduction preferential rate for small and micro enterprises in goods and service procurement projects has been increased from the previously stipulated 6%-10% (as per Document No. 46 of Caiku 2020) to 10%-20%. Moreover, for large and medium-sized enterprises that form consortia with or subcontract to small and micro enterprises, the preferential rate has been elevated from 2%-3% to 4%-6%.

China is not a party to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). However, the country has been an observer of the WTO GPA since 2002.

Section 12 of the "Special Administrative Measures (Negative List) for Foreign Investment Access" provides that the foreign shareholding ratio in value‑added telecommunications services, except for e‑commerce, domestic multi‑party communications, store‑and‑forward services, and call centres, must not exceed 50%. According to the "Classification Catalogue of Telecommunications Services", value‑added telecommunications services include Internet data centre services, content delivery network services, domestic Internet protocol virtual private network services, Internet access services, online data processing and transaction processing services, domestic multi‑party communication services, store‑and‑forward services, call centre services, information services, code and regulation conversion services, and Internet domain name resolution services.
In 2024, the Chinese government removed foreign shareholding restrictions on six categories of value‑added telecommunications services within designated pilot areas in Beijing, Shanghai, Hainan, and Shenzhen. This policy now permits foreign enterprises to operate independently in the following value‑added telecommunications service sectors within those pilot zones: Internet data centre services, content distribution network services, Internet service provision, online data processing and transaction processing services, information services including information publication and delivery (excluding Internet news, online publishing, online audio‑visual services, and Internet cultural operations), and information protection and processing services. Reports indicate that by February 2025, 13 foreign‑invested enterprises had been granted approval to participate in this scheme.

Art. 6 of the "Administrative Provisions on Foreign‑funded Telecommunications Enterprises" stipulates that, unless otherwise prescribed by the State, the aggregate equity held by foreign investor(s) in a foreign‑funded telecommunications enterprise engaged in basic telecommunications services, excluding radio paging services, may not ultimately exceed 49%, and the "Classification Catalogue of Telecommunications Services" identifies all categories of basic telecommunications services that fall within the scope of this restriction.

Section 13 of the "Special Administrative Measures (Negative List) for Foreign Investment Access" stipulates that foreign investment in Internet news and information services, Internet publishing services, Internet audio-visual programme services, and cyber culture operations, excluding music, is prohibited. The prohibition also extends to Internet public information services, except in relation to content that has been liberalised in accordance with China’s commitments under the World Trade Organization.

Section 19 of the "Special Administrative Measures (Negative List) for Foreign Investment Access" provides that investment in the following areas shall be prohibited, namely aerial imaging and mapping, real 3D maps, electronic navigational charts, remote sensing geology, and the compilation of topographic maps.

China’s national security review regime is primarily governed by the Measures on National Security Review of Foreign Investment (NSR Measures), issued on 19 December 2020 by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and MOFCOM. The NSR Measures build on earlier regulations, including the Circular of the General Office of the State Council on the Establishment of Security Review System Regarding Merger and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (2011 Circular) and the Measures for the National Security Review of Foreign Investment Pilot Free Trade Zones from the State Council General Office (Free Trade Zone Circular), which technically remain effective but have been rarely applied in practice.
The NSR Measures outline detailed rules for the national security review framework, managed by a Working Mechanism led by the NDRC and MOFCOM. The process consists of two stages: a General Review to assess whether a transaction requires further scrutiny, and a Special Review for a more in-depth assessment if potential national security risks are identified. According to Art. 4 of the Measures, the regime applies to foreign investments that: (i) involve control over enterprises in key sectors, such as critical infrastructure, technology, energy, and information services; or (ii) impact national security through equity acquisitions, asset purchases, or greenfield investments.
Furthermore, "control" is defined broadly, encompassing scenarios where foreign investors hold more than 50% equity, exert significant influence over operations or decision-making, or control key aspects of the business. It is reported that the NSR regime introduces clearer procedures compared to previous rules, it remains opaque regarding timelines, procedural details, and decision outcomes.

According to Art. 59 of the National Security Law of the People's Republic of China, the State shall establish comprehensive systems and mechanisms for national security review and oversight. These systems shall encompass the review of foreign commercial investments, special items and technologies, internet information technology products and services, projects related to national security, and other significant activities or matters that impact or could impact national security. Art. 60 provides that central state organs shall conduct national security reviews, issue opinions, and supervise enforcement in accordance with legal and administrative regulations. Moreover, Art. 61 mandates that provinces, autonomous regions, and directly governed municipalities shall be responsible for national security review and regulation within their administrative regions, ensuring compliance with the law.

According to Art. 11-13 of the Provisions on Administration of Foreign-Invested Telecommunications Enterprises, investors seeking to establish foreign-invested telecommunications enterprises—whether for basic telecommunications services or value-added services—must submit a project application report. This report should include the names and basic information of the joint venture parties, the total investment in the business, registered capital, each party's capital proportion, the type of business applied for, and the duration of the joint venture.
Additionally, under Art. 14 of the Provisions, the project proposal and feasibility study report must provide a business forecast, development plan, and an analysis of the return on investment. Furthermore, as stated in Art. 3 of the Implementing Rules of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Capital Enterprises, the establishment of foreign capital enterprises must contribute to the development of China's national economy and demonstrate the potential for significant economic benefits.

China imposes anti-dumping duties on optical fibre preforms imported from Japan and the United States, with current rates of 14.4%-31.2% for Japanese products and 17.4%-41.7% for those from the United States. The measures were first introduced in August 2015 for two years, extended in 2018 for a further five years, and renewed again in July 2024 for an additional five-year period. Optical fibre preforms are a key input in the manufacture of optical fibres, which are used to transmit signals through various types of optical cables.

In January 2005, the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China announced anti-dumping duties on non-displacement single-mode optical fibres (used, for example, for long-distance telephony and multichannel television broadcasting systems) (HS code: 9001.1000) imported from Japan and South Korea. This measure was reviewed and extended in January 2011 and, subsequently, in January 2017 and January 2022. The rate of duty imposed on imports originating in Japan is 46%, while imports originating in South Korea range from 7.9% to 46%, depending on the company.

In April 2011, the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China announced anti-dumping duties on non-displacement single-mode optical fibres (used, for example, for long-distance telephony and multichannel television broadcasting systems) (HS code: 9001.1000) imported from the EU and the U.S. This measure was reviewed and extended in April 2017 and, subsequently in April 2022. The duty rate on imports originating from the European Union ranges from 12.9% to 29.1%, depending on the company. The duty rate on imports originating from the United States ranges from 33.3% to 78.2%, depending on the company.