The European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) provides a comprehensive framework for data protection that applies to all EU Member States. The GDPR was implemented in Sweden through a variety of pieces of legislation including the Act with supplementary provisions to the GDPR (SFS 2018:218) and the Ordinance with Supplementary Provisions to the GDPR (SFS 2018:219).

Under the EU Directive on Data Retention, operators were required to retain certain categories of traffic and location data (excluding the content of those communications) for a period between six months and two years and to make them available, on request, to law enforcement authorities for the purposes of investigating, detecting and prosecuting serious crime and terrorism. On 8 April 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union declared the Directive invalid. However, not all national laws that implemented the Directive have been overturned.
In Sweden, Section 22 of Chapter 9 of the Electronic Communications Act (SFS 2022:482) stipulates minimum periods of retention for certain types of data in order to aid law enforcement. This requires, inter alia, that telecommunications operators retain internet access data for ten months, location information for two months, and call data for six months. These requirements were previously outlined in Section 16 d of Chapter 6 of the Act (2003:389) on Electronic Communication (as amended in 2019), which has been superseded by the 2022 Act.

The Directive 2000/31/EC (E-Commerce Directive) is the legal basis governing the liability of Internet Services Providers (ISPs) in the EU Member States and includes a conditional safe harbour. Not all Member States have transposed the relevant articles consistently, leading to divergent national case law that could cause legal insecurity on an EU level.
The Act on Electronic Commerce and Information Society Services (2002) implements Directive 2000/31/EC (E-Commerce Directive), however it fails to establish a conditional safe harbour for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Sweden.

The Directive 2000/31/EC (E-Commerce Directive) is the legal basis governing the liability of Internet Services Providers (ISPs) in the EU Member States and includes a conditional safe harbour. Not all Member States have transposed the relevant articles consistently, leading to divergent national case law that could cause legal insecurity on an EU level.
The Act on Electronic Commerce and Information Society Services (2002) implements Directive 2000/31/EC (E-Commerce Directive), however it fails to establish a conditional safe harbour for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Sweden.

As stipulated in Art. 24 of Law 2022:482 on Electronic Communications, as amended by the Swedish statute book (SFS) 2022:1086, any individual or entity offering an interpersonal communication service based on publicly available prepaid numbers or a prepaid Internet connection service is prohibited from providing access to the service without first registering the following details: (1) the name and postal address of the subscriber, (2) the subscriber's social security number, coordination number, organisation number, or other identification number, and (3) the number or other designation of the service. Additionally, the provider must record the time of registration, and this information must be retained and made available for up to one year after the cessation of service provision.

Art. 17 of Directive 2019/790 on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (DSM Directive) mandates that providers of content-sharing services seek authorisation from rights holders and implement technical solutions to remove and prevent unauthorised uploads by their users (so-called upload filters), under penalty of losing their liability safe harbour. Further arrangements are envisaged for complaints and dispute resolution mechanisms. Such upload filters are reported to be a significant cost for online platforms. Graduated exemptions are expected to be put in place for new providers active in the EU for less than three years with a turnover under EUR 10 million, and with fewer than five million users. The provision is subject to a challenge in the Court of Justice by Poland (C-401/19).
Sweden has not yet implemented the Directive 2019/790.

The Act on Responsibility for Electronic Bulletin Board requires internet sites, where users can post comments about a particular issue or topic and reply to other users' postings (i.e. bulletin boards), to monitor the service regularly and to an extent that may reasonably be required taking into account the scope and nature of the service. An intentional or grossly negligent violation of the obligation to remove illegal content is considered as a criminal offence. The Act includes an information duty (Section 3), a supervision duty (Section 4), and a duty to erase certain messages (Section 5).
This is despite Art. 15 of Directive 2000/31/EC (e-Commerce Directive) stating that Member States should not impose on providers a general obligation to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.

The Protective Security Act, which was amended in 2019 to allow Swedish security and intelligence forces to recommend the revocation of operating licenses for firms in sectors important to national security if they are found to pose a security risk. The law was used in 2020 to ban Huawei and ZTE equipment from being used in the Swedish network. Specifically, the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority (PTS) has told telecommunications operators in Sweden vying for licensing rights at auction that bids including Huawei or ZTE equipment will not be considered, and pre-existing Huawei and ZTE infrastructure would need to be decommissioned by 2025. This effective ban on Huawei and ZTE equipment has been challenged in court, but so far, the decision has been upheld in the Swedish court.

The Directive 2016/943 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) is key in harmonising national laws concerning trade secrets. Sweden transposed the Directive through a series of amendments to existing legislation as well as the Trade Secrets Act of 2018.

In Sweden, the sharing of passive infrastructure is mandated to support the delivery of telecommunications services to end users. Pursuant to Sections 15 and 16 of Chapter 5 of the Electronic Communications Act, operators classified as undertakings with significant market power may be required to comply with reasonable requests for access to and use of infrastructure essential for the construction of electronic communications networks, as well as networks and associated facilities necessary for providing electronic communications services.

The Swedish government owns a 39.5% stake in Telia, one of Sweden's largest telecommunications firms. The government had full ownership of Telia up until 2006, when Telia merged with Sonera, and the Swedish government's stake fell to 46%. They have since divested further, bringing the current stake to 39.5%

Sweden requires functional separation for operators with significant market power (SMP) in the telecommunications sector. Section 24 of Chapter 5 of the Electronic Communications Act provides that, in exceptional circumstances, the regulatory authority may require a vertically integrated operator, subject to an access obligation, to organisationally separate the activities related to that obligation. This separation must ensure that the activities are managed by an independent business unit. A vertically integrated operator is defined as an entity supplying services to undertakings with which it competes in downstream markets.

The Protective Security Act, which was amended in 2019 to allow Swedish security and intelligence forces to recommend the revocation of operating licenses for firms in sectors important to national security if they are found to pose a security risk, was used in 2020 to ban Huawei and ZTE equipment from being used in the Swedish network. Specifically, the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority (PTS) has told telecommunications operators in Sweden vying for licensing rights at auction that bids including Huawei or ZTE equipment will not be considered, and pre-existing Huawei and ZTE infrastructure would need to be decommissioned by 2025. This effective ban on Huawei and ZTE equipment has been challenged in court, but so far, the decision has been upheld in the Swedish court.

Art. 85 of the Utilities Directive (2014/25/EU) contains provisions allowing contracting public entities to reject foreign goods not covered by any EU international commitments from its tender procedures. In these cases, a tender submitted for the award of a supply contract may be rejected where the proportion of the products originating in third countries exceeds 50% of the total value of the products constituting the tender (Art. 85.2). Additionally, in cases of equivalent offers, the provisions provide for a preference for European tenders and tenders covered by EU's international obligations. In practice, this possibility has rarely been used.
In Sweden, the Directive has been transposed with the Law (2016:1146) on Procurement in the Utilities Sector and the Procurement Regulations.

There are no foreign ownership limitations in sectors relevant for digital trade.