The US has ratified the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty.

The US has ratified the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Performances and Phonograms Treaty.

The Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) provides a framework for the effective protection of trade secrets by establishing a federal claim for misappropriation of trade secrets. Until the adoption of the DTSA, trade secrets had been protected at the state level, with all states, other than New York, adopting their own version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA). States adopting the UTSA impose liability for improper acquisition of trade secrets; use or disclosure of a trade secret is not required for liability, though additional damages may accrue. On the other hand, States (New York) adopting the Restatement of Torts (Section 757) approach require unauthorised use or disclosure for liability to accrue.

It is reported that there is an obligation for passive infrastructure sharing in the country to deliver telecom services to end users. It is practised in both the mobile and fixed sectors based on commercial agreements.

It is reported that the U.S. does not mandate functional separation for operators with significant market power (SMP) in the telecom market. However, accounting separation is required by law.

It is reported that entities intending to offer telecommunications services between the United States and any foreign destination are required to apply for, and obtain, an international Section 214 authorisation from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934, prior to initiating service. The approval of licence assignment applications may occur as swiftly as overnight or may extend over several months, depending on various factors, including the involvement of foreign ownership. Although the FCC has established detailed licensing timelines, including a 14-day streamlined review process for the majority of international Section 214 applications, this expedited procedure is typically suspended in cases where aggregate foreign ownership exceeds 10%. In such instances, the FCC refers the application to the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector (commonly referred to as Team Telecom), which conducts potentially protracted national security reviews.

Under Section 310(b) of the Communications Act, prior approval from the Federal Communications Commission, which is generally granted upon application, is needed for common carrier wireless licensees to have direct foreign ownership of no more than 20% and indirect foreign ownership of no more than 25%.

Section 1.50002 of the Commission's rules mandates that the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau publish a "Covered List" of communications equipment and services deemed to pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security or the safety of U.S. persons. This designation is based on specific sources of risk assessment. Telecommunications providers in the U.S. are required to remove any equipment or services from companies on this list from their networks and are prohibited from using Federal Communications Commission (FCC) funds to acquire such equipment or services. The Covered List includes several foreign companies, such as Huawei, ZTE, Hytera Communications, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology, Dahua Technology, AO Kaspersky Lab, China Mobile International USA, China Telecom (Americas) Corp, Pacific Networks Corp, and China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited.

Although the US is a signatory to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), its coverage schedules do not fully cover the three most relevant service sectors (CPC 752, 754, 84). While value-added telecommunications services are covered, the agreement does not cover procurement of public utility services, including telecommunications and automatic data processing (ADP)-related telecommunications services.

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Section 3 of Executive Order 13913 formally establishes the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector, commonly known as Team Telecom, which assists the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in reviewing national security and law enforcement concerns related to foreign involvement in the U.S. telecommunications sector. Under Section 5, the Committee is authorised to conduct a 120-day review of certain applications referred by the FCC, with the possibility of a 90-day extension if a secondary assessment is required. Section 9 empowers the Committee to recommend a range of actions to the FCC, including approval without objection, approval subject to mitigation measures, denial, or modification or revocation of a licence. It has been reported that, following procedures initiated prior to the issuance of the Executive Order, the FCC revoked the licences of four foreign common carrier wireless providers.

It is reported that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) led by the Department of the Treasury is an interagency body responsible for reviewing foreign investments to safeguard U.S. national security. Its authority includes blocking, unwinding, or imposing conditions on transactions deemed harmful to national interests. A major legislative development, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) of 2018, significantly broadened CFIUS’s scope. While the committee initially focused on transactions involving foreign control of U.S. businesses, FIRRMA extended its jurisdiction to certain non-controlling investments, particularly in sectors involving critical technologies, infrastructure, and sensitive personal data. It also introduced mandatory filing requirements for specific transactions, especially those related to critical technologies. Under the Biden administration, CFIUS’s scrutiny has intensified. A recent executive order directs the committee to consider additional factors such as the resilience of critical supply chains, technological leadership in fields like artificial intelligence and biotechnology, investment trends, cybersecurity threats, and data privacy. Between 2017 and 2021, CFIUS reviewed 1,156 notices, with notable interventions in the semiconductor sector, and particularly involving Chinese entities. Prominent cases include the blocked acquisition of Qualcomm by Broadcom (2018), the forced divestment of Grindr by Chinese firm Kunlun (2019), and the review of ByteDance’s acquisition of Musical.ly (2020) due to concerns over data privacy and national security.

Pursuant to Section 1.31 of Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), an applicant that qualifies as a juristic entity must be represented by a registered patent attorney or agent. In effect, this provision precludes companies and other organisational entities from representing themselves in proceedings before the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), thereby requiring them to engage a qualified practitioner to act on their behalf.

In July 2020, the United States initiated an anti-subsidy investigation on imports of silicon metal (HS Code: 280469) from Kazakhstan, which is also used for producing silicon compounds as well as silicon wafers used as electronic semiconductors. In April 2021, the United States imposed a definitive countervailing duty with a rate of 160%.

The US Department of State has decided not to use Lenovo Group Ltd. computers on a classified network, under fears that hardware-level backdoors could exist in these products. Lenovo hardware is also reportedly banned by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), although no evidence of any wrongdoing on Lenovo's part has been presented.