According to the Map Management Regulations, online maps are required to set up their server inside of the country, and an official certificate must be required.

China's General Administration of Press and Publications agency selects which publications and audiovisual products may enter China, while the State Administration on Radio, Film, and Culture and the Ministry of Culture review various media. Additionally, China's Ministry of Culture selects which entities may import finished audiovisual products. This effective monopoly on the import and distribution of multimedia products means that China tightly restricts the import of cultural media into the country, including reading materials (e.g. newspapers, periodicals, electronic publications), audiovisual home entertainment products (e.g. video, compact discs, digital video discs), sound recordings (e.g. recorded audio tapes), and films for theatrical release. These measures have been the focus of a WTO investigation launched by the United States in 2007 (DS363). The panel ruled in favour of the complainant, deeming that China had not adequately substantiated its defence, which concerned the need to protect public morals. In total, the panel found 29 WTO violations throughout various Chinese regulations, catalogues, rules, opinions, and legal instruments. Rather than fully implementing the panel's recommendations, China and the US reached a memorandum of understanding via a negotiated settlement. Many of the associated laws remain in place, and their influence is amplified by provincial and local-level regulations that cite them.

In December 2018, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the General Administration of Customs issued the adjusted catalogue of used mechanical and electrical products prohibited from import, effective from January 2019. The adjusted catalogue includes video recorders, sound recorders or playback equipment using semiconductor media, disc-type broadcast video recorders, and colour LCD monitors that can be directly connected and designed for automatic data processing equipment.

Under the Cryptography Law, the import and export of commercial encryption products, technologies, and services remain subject to government approval. Commercial encryption products that may affect national security and public interest and have encryption-based protective functions can only be imported under a permit. The Ministry of Commerce, the Office of State Commercial Cryptography Administration (OSCCA), and the General Administration of Customs publish catalogues of commercial encryption products subject to the above import permit and export controls. The requirements above do not apply to commercial encryption used in products for consumption by the general population. However, the cryptography law does not define the term, leaving it unclear how this is implemented in practice.
In addition, the Cryptography Law has removed the requirement for mandatory certification and has instead established a voluntary certification scheme, which encourages manufacturers to apply to qualified agencies for the testing and certification of their commercial encryption products. The products in the Product Catalogue are no longer subject to mandatory approval requirements before launching their product. The voluntary certification provides a marking that assures customers that their commercial encryption products conform with Chinese encryption standards. The product catalogue includes smart password keys, smart IC cards, ATM application systems, security authentication, and financial data encryption machines, among others.

Since September 2014, the Chinese State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) has tightened the regulation for foreign TV and online streaming content. According to the Notice concerning Further Implementing Regulations on the Management of Online Foreign Film and Television Dramas, online platforms have to limit foreign content to 30% of the streaming content made available online.

The section of the "Chinese Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited or Restricted from Export" that concerns technologies prohibited from export encompasses technologies related to the manufacture of electronic equipment, as well as telecommunications and satellite transmission services. The section concerning technologies restricted from export similarly includes items from these categories, but additionally covers technologies associated with internet and related services, together with software and information technology services.

It is reported that, citing national security considerations, China introduced two successive rounds of export controls on rare‑earth elements in April and October 2025, with the implementation of the second round suspended until November 2026. On 4 April 2025, China imposed export controls on seven heavy rare‑earth elements subject to licensing requirements, together with all related compounds, metals and magnets, and exporters are required to obtain a licence and disclose information regarding end users, which some firms view as commercially sensitive and which many exporters consider to be handled through an intentionally opaque, selective and slow process. A second wave of restrictions on 9 October 2025 extended the controls to a further five rare‑earth elements, associated products, equipment, technologies and specialist personnel expertise, thereby broadening the regime beyond physical goods to encompass technological know‑how and foreign‑made products incorporating Chinese inputs. Under these expanded rules, foreign firms would be required to obtain authorisation to export magnets containing even trace quantities (0.1%) of Chinese‑sourced rare‑earth elements or magnets manufactured using Chinese mining, processing or magnet‑making technologies.

It is reported that the Chinese Government is working to improve its standards system by incorporating both government guidance and market input, moving away from a solely government-led approach. Despite this progress, foreign participation in standards setting remains limited, and China often pursues unique national standards for strategic reasons. The revised standardisation Law, effective since January 2018, includes measures recognising the value of international standards and the participation of foreign-invested enterprises. However, foreign stakeholders are concerned that these measures still prioritise Chinese standards over international ones and do not ensure equal participation for foreign companies. Reports indicate that foreign companies often face restrictions in participating in China's domestic standards-setting processes, and even when participation is allowed, it is usually under less favourable terms than for domestic competitors.

China’s current certification requirements for telecommunications equipment are reported to conflict with its WTO obligations of limiting imported products to no more than one conformity assessment scheme and requiring the same mark for all products (Article 13.4.a of China’s WTO Accession).
China has three different licensing regimes: the State Radio Regulation of China (SRRC), the Network Access License (NAL) and the China Compulsory Certification (CCC). The CCC is required for a list of products that includes many types of IT products, such as video and audio equipment. The NAL is required for all telecommunications equipment in China. The NAL license requires extensive testing and support and may include network trials and review of the product by a local panel of experts, in addition to labouratory testing against China's national standards. Radio communication equipment intended to be marketed in China requires radio-type approval granted by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People’s Republic of China (MIIT)’s ‘State Radio Regulation Committee (SRRC). Specified equipment samples are tested in designated labouratories according to local Chinese standards.
Therefore, for a given piece of equipment, it can cost between USD 30,000-35,000 to test for all three licenses (SRRC, NAL, and CCC). The CCC mark is used for both Chinese and foreign products. Moreover, all testing for the CCC mark must be conducted in China, and US exporters are often required to submit their products to Chinese labouratories for additional tests.
The CCC certificate and permission to print the CCC mark must be renewed annually as part of a follow-up certification. Part of the follow-up certification is also a one-day factory audit.
China is also reported as having limitations on foreign -invested conformity assessment bodies in the country.

The Administrative Measures for the Multi-level Protection of Information Security (MLPS) require all IT systems in China to be classified into different levels of security, from one to five (with the most sensitive systems designated as level 5). In 2019, the MLPS 2.0 (composed by GB/T 22239-2019, GB/T 25070-2019, and GB/T 28448-2019) has expanded the definition of 'information systems' to broader systems, including network infrastructure, cloud computing systems, mobile application platforms, connected devices and industrial control systems.
The MLPS 2.0 requires networks of level 3 and above to adopt network products and services appropriate to their security protection levels. Under the MLPS 2.0, companies must self-assess their security management and compliance, and such assessment results must be evaluated and endorsed by the MLPS regulatory body.
The MLPS 2.0 requires companies in China to set up their cloud infrastructure, including servers, virtualised networks, software, and information systems. Such cloud infrastructures are subject to testing and evaluation by the Chinese government. Overseas operation and maintenance of Chinese cloud computing platforms must also follow Chinese laws and regulations. The national standards also state that customers' data and users' personal information processed by cloud service providers should be stored inside China, which is an additional requirement. It is currently uncertain how these national standards would be enforced, and there have not yet been reports of enforcement.

The National Security Law foresees the rollout of a “secure and controllable” internet infrastructure. Under the National Security Law, the State can establish national security review and oversight management systems and mechanisms, conduct a national security review of foreign commercial investment, special items and technologies, internet information technology produces and services, projects involving national security matters, as well as other major matters and activities, that impact or might impact national security.

Art. 26 of the Cryptography Law stipulates that commercial cryptography products relating to national security, the national economy and the people’s livelihood, or the public interest, may be sold or otherwise made available for use only after passing testing and certification conducted by duly qualified bodies. Art. 27 further requires that, where operators of critical information infrastructure procure network products or services incorporating commercial cryptography that may affect national security, such products or services must undergo a national security review conducted jointly by the national cyberspace administration, the national cryptography administration, and other relevant authorities. Art. 28 provides that the department responsible for commerce under the State Council, together with the national cryptography administration, shall impose import licensing requirements, in accordance with the law, on commercial cryptography possessing encryption functions and bearing upon national security or the public interest; however, such licensing is not to apply to commercial cryptography used in mass‑consumption products. The legislation does not, however, clarify what constitutes commercial cryptography used in mass‑consumption products, thereby generating uncertainty as to how this significant exemption will operate in practice.
More generally, it is reported that there are onerous requirements on the use of encryption, including intrusive approval processes and, in many cases, mandatory use of indigenous encryption algorithms (e.g., for Wi-Fi and 4G cellular products).

China instituted a licensing system for online taxi companies, which requires that personal information and business data be stored and used in mainland China and not transferred outside of China. Such information should be retained for two years, except when otherwise required by other laws and regulations. The Measurement also requires that taxi companies' servers be set up in Mainland China, with a network security management system and technical measures for security protection in compliance with regulations.

According to Art. 19 of the Counter-Terrorism Law issued in 2016, telecom operators and Internet service providers shall establish content monitoring and network security programs. Likewise, companies are required to adopt precautionary security measures to prevent the dissemination of information on extremism, report terrorism information to the authorities in a timely manner, keep original records, and promptly delete such messages to prevent further circulation. The law introduces both pecuniary fines and detentions up to 15 days for telecommunications operators and ISPs personnel who fail to “stop transmission” of terrorist or extremist content, “shut down related services,” or implement “network security” measures to prevent the transmission of such content.

According to Art. 7 of the Administrative Provisions on Information Services of Mobile Internet Application Programs, app providers are required to monitor online content and report violations to government authorities. App providers and app stores must not use apps to endanger national security, disrupt the public order, or produce, reproduce, publish, or disseminate content banned by laws and regulations, according to the Provisions. In addition, app providers must monitor banned content and take action against users that publish banned content by issuing warnings, restricting functions, stopping updates, or terminating accounts. They must also keep a record of the violations and report the matters to relevant government authorities. In addition, according to Art. 8, app stores are required to verify the legitimacy of app providers and ensure app providers protect user information and publish lawful content. App stores are required to take action against offending app providers by issuing warnings, suspending their publications, or removing the aberrant apps from the stores. App stores are also required to keep records of the violations and report them to the relevant government authorities.