Pursuant to the authority conferred by the Customs Act 1901, the Anti-Dumping Commission, led by a Commissioner, is responsible for administering anti-dumping and countervailing measures. In May 2024, the Commission extended the anti-dumping duties originally imposed in May 2019 on PVC flat electric cables (HS 8544.49.20) imported from China. The applicable duty rates range from 2.8% to 18.9%, depending on the exporting company.

In April 2023, the Australian Government, acting under the Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) Direction 001-2023, prohibited the use of TikTok on all federal government devices. This measure aligned Australia with its Five Eyes intelligence-sharing partners, namely the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand, and was adopted in response to cybersecurity concerns associated with the Chinese-owned application. According to official statements, the decision was based on assessments conducted by national intelligence and security agencies, with implementation to occur “as soon as practicable.” In response, TikTok expressed concern, noting that the measure was introduced without specific security findings being publicly disclosed or prior consultation with the company.
Furthermore, in February 2025, the Australian Government, acting under the Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) 001-2025, extended similar restrictions to products, applications, and web services developed by the Chinese artificial intelligence firm DeepSeek on government networks and devices. The Government indicated that this prohibition was grounded in a risk and threat assessment identifying security risks associated with the use of such technologies.

The 2012 Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs) were amended in June 2024 to raise the procurement thresholds for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Pursuant to Sections 5.7 and 5.8, at least 25% (up from 20%) of procurements valued below AUD 1 billion (approx. USD 660 million), and 40% (up from 35%) of procurements valued below AUD 20 million (approx. USD 13 million), must be sourced from domestic SMEs.
In addition, the amendment raised the SME exemption threshold from AUD 200,000 (approx. USD 130,000) to AUD 500,000 (approx. USD 330,000). This threshold denotes the value below which Australian Government entities may procure directly from SMEs without conducting a full open tender procedure.

The Commonwealth Indigenous Procurement Policy (IPP), as updated in June 2025, establishes both procurement targets for purchasing from Indigenous enterprises and a Mandatory Set-Aside (MSA) mechanism to direct Commonwealth contracts to such enterprises (Section 1.3.2). The MSA applies to all procurements conducted in remote areas, as well as to procurements wholly delivered within Australia with an estimated value between AUD 80,000 and AUD 200,000 (approx. USD 55,000–140,000).
Furthermore, Section 1.3.3 of the Policy introduces Indigenous participation targets for high-value contracts wholly delivered in Australia, specifically those valued at AUD 7.5 million (approx. USD 5 million) or more within designated industry categories. These targets, referred to as the Mandatory Minimum Indigenous Participation Requirements (MMR), include the obligation that, in procurement processes subject to the MMR, contracting authorities must take into account a tenderer’s past performance in meeting MMR targets under previous Commonwealth contracts.

Australia is a party to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), and its commitments also cover the services sectors considered most important for digital trade, namely telecommunication services (CPC 752), telecommunication-related services (CPC 754), and computer and related services (CPC 84).

The Telstra Corporations Act 1991 provides under Section 8BG that aggregate foreign ownership of Telstra (the incumbent telecommunication company) is limited to 35%, and individual foreign investors are only allowed to own up to 5%. This specific cap was imposed in 1999 as part of an amendment to the Act.
Additionally, the National Broadband Network Companies Act 2011 provides that the Commonwealth must retain full ownership of National Broadband Network Co (NBN Co) (Part 3, Division 2, Subdivision A). This ownership structure could be terminated only in limited circumstances (Part 3, Division 2, Subdivision B). This rule has been in place since its enactment in 2011.

Pursuant to Section 201A of the Corporations Act 2001, a proprietary company is required to have at least one director who is ordinarily resident in Australia. For a public company, a minimum of three directors is required, at least two of whom must be ordinarily resident in Australia. This requirement has been in force since the enactment of the Act in 20

Australia operates a general ex ante foreign investment screening regime under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (FATA), under which covered transactions are assessed against the national interest. Under Art. 47 of FATA, a “notifiable action” includes the acquisition by a foreign person of a substantial interest in an Australian entity where the relevant monetary threshold test is met. As established under Division 2 of FATA, a “substantial interest” is generally an interest of at least 20%. The monetary threshold criterion is met when either the total value of the target entity’s assets or the total value of the securities issued exceeds the applicable indexed threshold. For 2025, the relevant thresholds range from AUD 1,464 million (approx. USD 1,035 million) for certain private investors from specified free trade agreement partner jurisdictions acquiring a substantial interest in a non-sensitive entity, to AUD 339 million (approx. USD 240 million) for private investors not from those partner jurisdictions and for acquisitions involving sensitive businesses.
It is reported that “sensitive businesses” include, inter alia, media, telecommunications, transport, defence and military-related activities, encryption and security technologies, communications systems, and nuclear-related activities. FATA does not exhaustively define “national interest”; however, the government guidance note No. 8 indicates that the assessment typically considers national security, competition, economic and community impacts, the character of the investor, and tax and other government policy considerations.

Under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (FATA), Australia subjects certain foreign investments to national security screening, combining mandatory ex ante notification with call-in and last-resort ex post powers. Under Section 55B, a notifiable national security action arises where a foreign person proposes to start a national security business, acquire a direct interest in a national security business (or in an entity carrying on such a business), or acquire an interest in national security land. The term national security business is defined in Section 8AA of the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Regulation 2015, including businesses connected to critical infrastructure, telecommunications carriers or nominated carriage service providers, businesses supplying critical military or intelligence goods, technologies, or services, and certain businesses handling classified information or sensitive data relating to defence and intelligence personnel. Government guidance further indicates that, where this national security screening applies, notification is generally required regardless of transaction value.
Australia’s national security screening framework also includes ex post review mechanisms. Under Section 66A of FATA, the Treasurer may review a reviewable national security action (and certain significant actions) on national security grounds. Investments not subject to mandatory notification may be voluntarily notified to reduce the risk of later review, while non-notified investments may be called in for a national security assessment. In addition, Division 3 of Part 3 of FATA establishes last-resort powers, including powers to vary or revoke conditions, impose new conditions, or require divestment where national security risks arise after an initial assessment or approval.
In practice, these powers have been invoked to restrict foreign participation on grounds of national security and national interest. For example, in 2012, the Australian Government blocked Huawei Technologies Co Ltd from tendering for contracts associated with the National Broadband Network (NBN), citing cybersecurity concerns. More recently, in June 2024, the Treasurer ordered several China-linked investors to dispose of their shares in the rare earths miner Northern Minerals, including Yuxiao Fund, Ximei Liu, Xi Wang, and Black Stone Resources.

Australia is a party to the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).

The Law on Electronic Commerce provides a comprehensive framework for consumer protection that also applies to online transactions.

Azerbaijan has acceded to the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts.

Azerbaijan has not adopted national legislation based on or influenced by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Electronic Commerce.

The List of Executive Authorities Responsible for Implementing Export Controls, approved by Decision No. 230, stipulates that telecom and information security systems are subject to export and re‑export licensing requirements. With regard to telecom security systems, the issuance of special permits is entrusted to the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport of the Republic of Azerbaijan. With regard to information security, special permits are issued based on conclusions provided by the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport, the State Security Service and the Special State Protection Service of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Section 4.14 of the "Rules for the Certification of Telecommunications Equipment and Devices in Azerbaijan" stipulates that telecommunications equipment and devices (TE) lacking a certificate of conformity and imported without recognition under the national certification system shall not be permitted for release into the customs territory of Azerbaijan, and their sale and operation are prohibited. Section 6.1 further provides that the second and third phases of the TE certification process include the selection of a sample and its submission for testing to the Telecommunications Equipment Certification Centre (TECC) of the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport and, where necessary, to accredited testing laboratories of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Emergency Situations or other relevant authorities.