The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 requires a telecommunication service provider to keep specific telecommunications data relating to the services it offers for two years (187C). The dataset to be kept includes the subscriber, the accounts of telecommunications devices, the source of communication, the destination of a communication, the date, time, and duration of a communication, the type of communication, and the location of the equipment or line used (187AA). This retention scheme was inserted into the Act by the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015.

The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 grants criminal law enforcement agencies the authority to intercept real-time communications without a warrant. The Act addresses various types of interception warrants, including an interception warrant (Section 10), a telecommunications service warrant (Section 11A), a foreign communications warrant (Section 11C), and a stored communications warrant (Section 110). However, in emergency situations (Section 30) or for the purpose of developing and testing interception capabilities (Section 31A), law enforcement officers or agencies may intercept live communications without obtaining a warrant.

Sections 317L–317RA of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), as amended by the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018, establish a mechanism whereby security and law enforcement agencies may issue Technical Assistance Notices (TANs) to communications providers. These notices require providers to take specified steps to assist agencies in performing their national security or criminal law enforcement functions.
The scope of application is broad, as “designated communications providers” include not only telecommunications carriers and service providers but also any entity that supplies electronic services, such as websites or encrypted messaging platforms. Recipients of a TAN may therefore be required to provide technical assistance, including facilitating access to encrypted communications. Notably, the framework permits such requests to be made without a warrant.

Under Australian law, trade secrets are treated as a subset of confidential information and are primarily protected under common law principles, complemented by relevant statutory provisions, including those contained in the Corporations Act 2001 and the Competition and Consumer Act 2010.
In addition, the Treasury Laws Amendment (2018 Measures No. 3) Act 2018 introduced specific provisions reinforcing the protection of confidential information. Together, this legal framework provides remedies against the unauthorised use or disclosure of such information. Available causes of action include claims for breach of confidence, with courts empowered to grant relief in the form of injunctions, damages, and an account of profits in cases of misappropriation.

Sections 36 and 101 of the Copyright Act contain safe harbour protections for carriage service providers such as Internet infrastructure providers and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). To qualify, these organisations must implement mechanisms to enable copyright owners to report infringing content on their platforms and request that action is taken to prevent the infringement (for example, disabling access to the content or terminating the accounts of infringing users).

According to Art. 34 of the Telecommunications Act 1997, telecommunications carriers have statutory rights of access to other carriers' towers and ducts, but such access is not mandated. Passive infrastructure sharing is practised in Australia's mobile sector: co-location is negotiated on a commercial basis. Carriers have regulated rights of access to towers owned by other carriers for the purposes of providing carriage services. The Telecommunications Act 1997 provides for carriers to grant other carriers access to telecommunications transmission towers, the sites of telecommunications transmission towers, and eligible underground facilities. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has issued a code that sets out conditions to be complied with in relation to the provision of access.
In addition, passive infrastructure sharing is also practised in Australia in the fixed sector: the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has declared the following services: - line sharing service (LSS) - local carriage service (LCS) - fixed originating access service (FOAS) - fixed terminating access service (FTAS) - unconditioned local loop service (ULLS) - wholesale line rental (WLR) - wholesale ADSL service (WADSL). Once a service is declared, a network owner must provide access to the service upon request.

A basic legal framework on intermediary liability beyond copyright infringement is absent in Australia's law and jurisprudence. It is reported that the basis for third parties' liability for individuals' online actions is confusing and, viewed as a whole, largely incoherent. The result is significant uncertainty.

According to Section 8BG of the Telstra Corporations Act 1991 (as amended by Act No. 53 of 1999), foreign ownership of Telstra (the incumbent telecommunications company) is limited to 35%, and individual foreign investors are permitted to own up to 5%.

According to the National Broadband Network Companies Act 2011 (Subdivision A, Division 2, Part 3), the Commonwealth must retain full ownership of National Broadband Network Co (NBN Co). In addition, this ownership structure could be terminated only in limited circumstances (Subdivision B).

In April 2023, the Australian Government, acting under the Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) Direction 001-2023, prohibited the use of TikTok on all federal government devices. This measure aligned Australia with its Five Eyes intelligence-sharing partners, namely the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand, and was adopted in response to cybersecurity concerns associated with the Chinese-owned application. According to official statements, the decision was based on assessments conducted by national intelligence and security agencies, with implementation to occur “as soon as practicable.” In response, TikTok expressed concern, noting that the measure was introduced without specific security findings being publicly disclosed or prior consultation with the company.
Furthermore, in February 2025, the Australian Government, acting under the Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) 001-2025, extended similar restrictions to products, applications, and web services developed by the Chinese artificial intelligence firm DeepSeek on government networks and devices. The Government indicated that this prohibition was grounded in a risk and threat assessment identifying security risks associated with the use of such technologies.

The 2012 Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs) were amended in June 2024 to raise the procurement thresholds for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Pursuant to Sections 5.7 and 5.8, at least 25% (up from 20%) of procurements valued below AUD 1 billion (approx. USD 660 million), and 40% (up from 35%) of procurements valued below AUD 20 million (approx. USD 13 million), must be sourced from domestic SMEs.
In addition, the amendment raised the SME exemption threshold from AUD 200,000 (approx. USD 130,000) to AUD 500,000 (approx. USD 330,000). This threshold denotes the value below which Australian Government entities may procure directly from SMEs without conducting a full open tender procedure.

The Commonwealth Indigenous Procurement Policy (IPP), as updated in June 2025, establishes both procurement targets for purchasing from Indigenous enterprises and a Mandatory Set-Aside (MSA) mechanism to direct Commonwealth contracts to such enterprises (Section 1.3.2). The MSA applies to all procurements conducted in remote areas, as well as to procurements wholly delivered within Australia with an estimated value between AUD 80,000 and AUD 200,000 (approx. USD 55,000–140,000).
Furthermore, Section 1.3.3 of the Policy introduces Indigenous participation targets for high-value contracts wholly delivered in Australia, specifically those valued at AUD 7.5 million (approx. USD 5 million) or more within designated industry categories. These targets, referred to as the Mandatory Minimum Indigenous Participation Requirements (MMR), include the obligation that, in procurement processes subject to the MMR, contracting authorities must take into account a tenderer’s past performance in meeting MMR targets under previous Commonwealth contracts.

Australia is a party to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), and its commitments also cover the services sectors considered most important for digital trade, namely telecommunication services (CPC 752), telecommunication-related services (CPC 754), and computer and related services (CPC 84).

The Telstra Corporations Act 1991 provides under Section 8BG that aggregate foreign ownership of Telstra (the incumbent telecommunication company) is limited to 35%, and individual foreign investors are only allowed to own up to 5%. This specific cap was imposed in 1999 as part of an amendment to the Act.
Additionally, the National Broadband Network Companies Act 2011 provides that the Commonwealth must retain full ownership of National Broadband Network Co (NBN Co) (Part 3, Division 2, Subdivision A). This ownership structure could be terminated only in limited circumstances (Part 3, Division 2, Subdivision B). This rule has been in place since its enactment in 2011.

Pursuant to Section 201A of the Corporations Act 2001, a proprietary company is required to have at least one director who is ordinarily resident in Australia. For a public company, a minimum of three directors is required, at least two of whom must be ordinarily resident in Australia. This requirement has been in force since the enactment of the Act in 20