The indicator "7.2.4 - Government Internet shut down in practice" of the V-Dem Dataset, which measures whether the government has the technical capacity to actively make internet service cease, thus interrupting domestic access to the internet or whether the government has decided to do so, has a score of 1 in Myanmar for the year 2025. This corresponds to "The government shut down domestic access to the Internet numerous times this year."
It is reported that since the military coup in February 2021, the military has frequently restricted connectivity by ordering internet shutdowns, slowdowns, and blocks while threatening service providers to ensure their compliance. The internet shutdown came in various forms: i) the nationwide cut-off of mobile data and fixed-line internet access; ii) nightly shutdowns affecting fixed-line (fibre-optic and cable) connectivity. Although the internet was on during the day in this period, users reported frequent short-term outages and slow speeds nationwide; iii) shut down public Wi-Fi connections; iv) shut down wireless broadband internet services indefinitely. Under orders from the military-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Transport and Communications has significant powers to cut off the internet without oversight or safeguards, as it controls much of the telecommunications infrastructure via the state-owned company Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications.

The Myanmar Printing and Publishing Law created the licensing regime for publishing houses, news agencies, and websites, and these outlets must register prior to producing content, including for publishing online.

Section 44 of the Cybersecurity Law stipulates that any entity seeking to establish a virtual private network (VPN) or to provide VPN services within the national cyberspace must obtain authorisation from the Ministry in accordance with the prescribed procedures.

According to Arts. 26-70 of the Telecommunication Law mandates that importers of telecommunications equipment get an import license from the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology.

Myanmar has not joined any agreement with binding commitments to open transfers of data across borders. Art. 12.15 of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) recognises that each party may maintain its own regulatory requirements governing cross‑border transfers of information by electronic means and stipulates that such transfers shall not be restricted when undertaken for the conduct of business by a covered person; however, the article simultaneously allows parties to adopt or maintain any measures they themselves deem necessary to achieve a legitimate public policy objective, as well as any measures necessary to protect essential security interests, with the parties expressly affirming that the determination of such necessity lies solely with the implementing party and that such measures shall not be subject to dispute. It is reported that this formulation enables the parties to preserve their domestic data‑control regime under the rubric of national security without risking inter‑state disputes, and that the relative weakness of Chapter 12 renders its provisions largely ineffectual in facilitating the liberalisation of cross‑border data flows, particularly because the clause entrusting necessity assessments to the implementing party effectively permits any measure to be characterised as legitimate at that party’s discretion.

Myanmar does not have a comprehensive regime in place for all personal data. However, the Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens set out provisions for the protection of privacy and security of communications. These are supplemented by sectoral legislation, such as the Telecommunications Law 2013, which contains provisions related to the confidentiality of personal information.

Art. 27 of the Electronic Transactions Law requires personal data administrators to retain personal data for a specified period before destruction. However, the regulation does not define the exact duration for which the data must be retained.

Section 33 of the Cybersecurity Law provides that a digital platform service provider shall retain, for a period of three years, specified categories of data relating to users of the service, namely: (a) the personal information of users accessing the service; (b) records of users’ utilisation of the service; and (c) such additional data as may be prescribed by the Department from time to time. Section 34 further stipulates that where any individual or organisation duly authorised under any law in force submits a written request for any or all of the data referred to in Section 33, the digital platform service provider is obliged to furnish such data in the prescribed manner. Pursuant to Section 4, “digital platform services” are defined as a category of business that provides services enabling users to display, transmit, disseminate, or otherwise utilise information online through cyber resources or analogous technologies and associated equipment, while a “digital platform service provider” refers to any person or organisation that offers such services for use within the State.

Myanmar lacks a comprehensive framework in place that provides effective protection of trade secrets, but there are limited measures addressing some issues related to them. Protection for confidential information comes from the law of contract, so there is no means of protection where no contractual relationship exists. The secret know-how will only be protected on the basis of a mutual legal relation created by agreements (non-disclosure or confidentiality agreements/clauses) signed with subcontractors, licensees, etc., obliging them to keep the information confidential, as well as agreements signed with employees under which they have a duty not to disclose the confidential information, both during the term of their employment and after its termination, and also obliging them (contractors, licensees, employees, etc.) not to use it for competition purposes.
Additionally, Section 19 of the Competition Law 2015 ('the Competition Law') refers to disclosing or using secrets of another business. In particular, no businessman shall, in respect of disclosing secrets of any other business, carry out any of the following acts: infringing security measures protected by the lawful owners of business secrets by accessing and collecting business secrets and information related to such secrets; using or revealing information of business secret without permission of the lawful owner of such business; deceiving a person with an obligation to maintain secrets or abusing the confidence of such person in accessing, collecting, or revealing business secrets and information related to such secrets.

It is reported that there is no obligation for passive infrastructure sharing in Myanmar to deliver telecom services to end users. However, it is practised in both the mobile and fixed sectors based on commercial agreements.

Section 3 of the State-Owned Economic Enterprise Law No. 9/89 stipulates that certain activities, including telecommunications services, are reserved exclusively for the State. However, the Government retains the authority to permit, via notification, the execution of these reserved activities through joint ventures between the Government and other individuals or economic organisations. It has been observed that the Government frequently grants exceptions to the exclusive rights of SOEs in various economic sectors, including telecommunications, by allowing joint ventures or issuing special licenses.

It is reported that the Government of Myanmar holds interests in certain telecommunications companies. In particular, Myanma Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), the incumbent telecommunications operator, is administered by the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT). However, the precise shareholding structure is unclear, particularly following the Joint Operations Agreement concluded in July 2014 with KDDI Summit Global Myanmar (KSGM), ultimately owned by the Japanese corporations KDDI Corporation and Sumitomo Corporation. Mytel likewise operates as a joint venture between a military-backed conglomerate and Viettel, a telecommunications company owned by the Vietnamese Ministry of Defence, although the respective ownership proportions are not publicly disclosed. Moreover, the remaining mobile service providers, Atom (formerly Telenor) and U9 (formerly Ooredoo), were operated by foreign companies prior to February 2021 but have since come under the ownership of firms reportedly linked to the military. For instance, in May 2024, Ooredoo completed the sale of its Myanmar operations to Nine Communications, a Singapore-based subsidiary allegedly controlled by military-linked individuals, and subsequently rebranded as U9 Myanmar. Similarly, Telenor divested its Myanmar operations in March 2022 to Investcom, a joint venture between Lebanon-based M1 Group and the military-linked local firm Shwe Byain Phyu, with the operator rebranded as Atom in June 2022. In February 2024, Shwe Byain Phyu reportedly sold its majority stake in Atom to Myancom Holding, following which allegations emerged that Myancom Holding functions as a shell company with beneficiaries identical to those of Shwe Byain Phyu; the precise ownership percentages in Atom, however, remain unclear.

It is reported that Malaysia does not require functional separation for operators with significant market power (SMP) in the telecom market. However, since 2015, there has been an obligation for accounting separation.

Chapter 3 of the Myanmar Telecommunications Law stipulates that any person, department, or business organisation, inside Myanmar or from abroad, willing to provide the following facilities and/or telecommunication services shall apply to the Directorate of Communication under the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology for permission and licence for the following services: (i) Network facility services (NFS); (b) Network Services (NS); and (ii) Application services (AS).
It is reported that the government issues tenders upon granting telecommunications licenses. The Government determines from a policy standpoint how many operators to let in. In addition, in 2020, it was reported that the government of Myanmar reportedly threatened to cancel licenses unless their holders complied with demands to block websites, including news outlets. Local government officials also stressed the need for providers to obtain permits to lay fibre-optic cables, build towers, and install Wi-Fi devices.

Myanmar has not appended the World Trade Organization (WTO) Telecom Reference Paper to its schedule of commitments.