The Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) establishes a comprehensive framework for data protection in Taiwan. Initially introduced in 1995, the Act underwent significant amendments in 2010, with the revised version coming into force in 2012. The Enforcement Rules of the Personal Data Protection Act provide further guidelines for the interpretation and implementation of the Act. The enforcement of the PDPA is carried out by ministries, commissions, and local governments. As mandated by the Constitutional Court's 111-Shien-Pan-13 judgement, the Legislative Yuan passed amendments to the Act in May 2023 to establish an independent supervisory mechanism for data protection. Article 1-1 of the amended PDPA specifies that the Personal Data Protection Commission (PDPC) will serve as the competent authority for the Act, consolidating enforcement powers previously dispersed among ministries, commissions, and local governments. The Preparatory Office of the PDPC was established in December 2023, assuming responsibility for interpreting the Act from the National Development Council as of January 2024.

Art. 9 of the Telecommunications Management Act requires telecom enterprises to retain communications records such as the numbers of the sender and the recipient, time of communication, address, service type, mailbox or location information. The "Regulations on Users of Telecommunications Businesses Inquiring Communication and Account Records" were established in accordance with the stipulations of Art. 9 of the Telecommunications Management Act. Under Art. 4 of the Regulations, telecommunications enterprises must retain communication records and accounting records for at least one year.

For law enforcement agencies to access the content of communications, they need either interception warrants or access warrants approved by a court. However, in urgent situations or for specific crimes, Art. 11.1 of the Communications Security and Surveillance Act provides that the agencies may access the communications without a warrant as long as they obtain it within 24 hours after the surveillance. It is reported that the lack of judicial review over surveillance requests has been increasingly normalised. More generally, it is reported that government units with certain investigative powers have gone directly to state agencies and private companies to request personal data without first receiving a court order or other oversight. For example, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, between 2017 and 2018, had a 100% success rate in receiving information from the 1,112 requests it filed for personal information. Of these, 1,000 requests were to non-government agencies, including Chunghwa Telecom, Taiwan Mobile CO., and Yahoo! Taiwan Holdings Limited. Between 2015 and 2016, the Ministry of Finance submitted 350 requests with a 99.4% success rate. The Criminal Investigation Bureau also reportedly issued 565 requests to Facebook through this process, with a 52.9% success rate, between 2015 and 2016.

The Copyright Act, as amended in 2009 with the introduction of Arts. 90-4 to 90-12, establishes a safe harbour regime for intermediaries for copyright infringements. They largely follow the framework of the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Internet service providers are divided into four categories with different conditions of eligibility of limitation on liability: connection service providers, caching service providers, information storage service providers, and search service providers.

A basic legal framework on intermediary liability beyond copyright infringement is absent in Taiwan's law and jurisprudence.

According to Art. 36 of the Telecommunications Management Act, direct foreign ownership of telecommunications services can be up to 49%, and total foreign ownership, whether direct or indirect, may not exceed 60%. These restrictions apply to entities that establish public telecommunications networks using telecommunications resources. The Telecommunications Management Act replaced the Telecommunications Act, which provided for a similar requirement for single Type I telecommunications operator (a facilities-based operator) (Art. 12). When the subordinate legislation under the Telecommunications Act will be fully repealed, the National Communications Commission will proceed with the formal repeal of the Act itself.

Chunghwa Telecom, the largest network operator in Taiwan, was originally a fully state-owned enterprise but was partially privatised in 2005, reducing the level of government's ownership. As of 2024, the government reportedly holds a 41% stake in the company. In addition, the government owns approximately 4.4% of the shares of Far Eastone Telecommunications Co., through state-linked entities, including Chunghwa Post Co. (2.9%) and the Labor Pension Fund (1.5%).

Art. 34 of the Telecommunications Management Act obliges operators with significant market power to implement accounting separation across their various service lines. However, the Act does not impose a requirement for functional separation.

Taiwan has appended the World Trade Organization (WTO) Telecom Reference Paper to its schedule of commitments.

The National Communications Commission (NCC), the executive authority responsible for the supervision and administration of telecommunications services, operates independently of the government in its decision-making processes. In accordance with Art. 8 of the National Communications Commission Organization Act, the NCC is required to exercise its functions autonomously and in conformity with the law. Under Art. 9, all matters that fall within the NCC’s remit, except those that Commission meeting resolutions have delegated to internal units through the administrative hierarchy, must be carried out on the basis of resolutions adopted at Commission meetings.

Cross-border transfers of personal data are, in principle, permissible under the Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA), unless expressly prohibited or restricted by the relevant central competent authorities. Pursuant to Art. 21 of the Act, such authorities may impose limitations on cross-border data transfers under the following circumstances: (i) where the transfer would compromise significant national interests; (ii) where the transfer is restricted or prohibited under an international treaty or agreement; (iii) where the recipient jurisdiction lacks adequate legal safeguards for personal data, thereby potentially infringing upon the rights or interests of data subjects; or (iv) where the transfer is intended to circumvent the provisions of the PDPA. Notably, this regulatory framework was previously codified in Art. 24 prior to the 2010 amendment of the Act.
On 25 September 2012, the National Communications Commission issued a general directive prohibiting communications enterprises—including telecommunications carriers and broadcasting operators—from transferring subscribers’ personal data to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), citing the inadequacy of data protection legislation in mainland China. Subsequently, in January 2022 and February 2023, the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Ministry of Labour, respectively, issued rulings prohibiting social work offices and human resources agencies from transferring the personal data of their service recipients to the PRC, based on similar concerns regarding insufficient legal protections. Finally, on 30 September 2025, the Ministry of Health and Welfare prohibited drug wholesalers and retailers from transferring personal data to China, Hong Kong and Macao, except in limited circumstances, due once again to the inadequacy of personal data protection laws in those jurisdictions.

Pursuant to Art. 8 of the Regulations on the Preparation and Management of Electronic Medical Records by Medical Institutions, when a medical institution utilises cloud services to collect, process, and use electronic medical records, the data storage location of the cloud service should, in principle, be situated in Taiwan.

Art. 44 of the Rules Governing the Administration of Electronic Payment Business, as amended in July 2021, stipulates that the information system and security management operations of an electronic payment institution must be established within the territory of Taiwan. However, this requirement does not apply where the institution satisfies specific conditions and obtains approval from the competent authority. These conditions include ensuring that the competent authority can access relevant information immediately, directly, completely, and continuously. To obtain such approval, the institution must submit documentation, including a confirmation letter from the local government authority where the offshore service provider is located, an inspection report from an independent IT auditor, a contingency plan with a supporting assessment, a supervision plan detailing oversight mechanisms, and a cost-benefit evaluation approved by the board of directors. In addition, the institution must not have been sanctioned for financial regulatory violations in the preceding year, must have addressed any deficiencies identified by regulators, and must not have any unresolved major information security breaches.
Prior to the 2021 amendment, the Rules contained a similar provision in Art. 23, which required that the information system and its backup system for the electronic payment business of specialised electronic payment institutions be established within the territory of Taiwan.

Art. 17 of the "Regulations Governing Internal Operating Systems and Procedures for the Outsourcing of Financial Institution Operation" obliges financial institutions outsourcing to overseas service providers to ensure that customer data is used strictly within the scope of the outsourced operations, kept separate from the data of the service provider and other institutions, and is accessible to the competent authority. Art. 18 mandates prior approval for outsourcing “material” retail financial business information systems abroad, requiring detailed documentation on data protection, risk management, and audit mechanisms. The term “material” refers to outsourced operations that, if disrupted or compromised, could significantly affect the financial institution’s operations or customer interests. Art. 19, which specifically addresses cloud-based services, stipulates that customer data from material retail financial systems shall, in principle, be stored within the territory of Taiwan, and if stored offshore, backups of important customer data must be retained domestically unless otherwise approved by the competent authority.

Taiwan is not a party to the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). However, any applicant from a WTO member who files a patent application in Taiwan based on a PCT application may claim a right of priority if the PCT application is legally sound.