In June 1991, the United States authorities imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal (HS Code: 280469) from China, which is used also for producing silicon compounds as well as silicon wafers used as electronic semiconductors. This measure was last extended in June 2018. The rate of duty on imports from China is 139.5%.

In March 2003, the United States authorities imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal (HS Code: 280469) from Russia, which is also used for producing silicon compounds as well as silicon wafers used as electronic semiconductors. This measure was last extended in June 2020. The rate of duty on imports from Russia is 79.4% for all companies, with the exception of Russian ZAO Kremny/Sual-Kremny-Ural Ltd, which gets a 56.1% duty.

In July 2020, the United States initiated an anti-subsidy investigation on imports of silicon metal (HS Code: 280469) from Kazakhstan, which is also used for producing silicon compounds as well as silicon wafers used as electronic semiconductors. In April 2021, the United States imposed a definitive countervailing duty with a rate of 160%.

The US Department of State has decided not to use Lenovo Group Ltd. computers on a classified network, under fears that hardware-level backdoors could exist in these products. Lenovo hardware is also reportedly banned by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), although no evidence of any wrongdoing on Lenovo's part has been presented.

In June 2023, the U.S. Federal Government issued the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) clause, FAR 52.204-27, implementing the No TikTok on Government Devices Act. This clause prohibits the presence or use of the TikTok application on IT equipment used by government contractors and their personnel during the performance of a federal contract. The measure was introduced to protect government information in response to national security concerns. The regulation took effect immediately and applies to all new government contracts, including those that fall below the simplified acquisition threshold, as well as contracts for commercial products and commercial services.
It is reported that certain related restrictions apply since January 2020, when the United States Army and Navy banned TikTok from government devices following the Defense Department's designation of the app as a security risk. A Navy bulletin posted on a Facebook page for military personnel warned that users of government-issued mobile devices who did not remove TikTok would be blocked from accessing the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet.

After the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence’s 2012 report, the United States enacted several laws (beginning with the Consolidated and Further Appropriations Act, 2013) that restrict federal procurement of and grant and loan spending on Huawei systems. Although the 2013 Appropriations Act does not name Huawei, some observers and Members of Congress described it as designed to address risks posed by Huawei and ZTE.
In the National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018, the United States placed Huawei-related restrictions into federal law beyond the context of appropriations. The 2018 NDAA prohibits the Department of Defence (DOD) from procuring certain telecommunications equipment or services from Huawei and others as part of the DOD’s missions related to nuclear deterrence and homeland defence. Unlike earlier appropriations provisions, the 2018 NDAA names Huawei in the legislation. The 2018 NDAA prohibits DOD from procuring, obtaining, extending, or renewing contracts that include telecommunications equipment or services provided by Huawei, ZTE, or any entity that the Secretary of Defence reasonably believes is owned, controlled by, or “otherwise connected to” the Chinese or Russian governments. To fall within the 2018 NDAA, the telecommunications equipment or services must be a substantial or essential component or critical technology of the system provided to the DOD for its nuclear deterrence or homeland defence missions.
The John S. McCain National Defence Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 2019 provides a broader set of Huawei-related restrictions that apply across the executive branch. It restricts [Section 889(a)(1)(A)] executive agencies from procuring systems that contain Huawei equipment or services and prohibits [Section 889(a)(1)(B)] executive agencies from contracting with companies that use Huawei equipment or services in the companies’ own systems—even if those systems are not sold to the government. The Joe Biden administration has stepped up restrictions on Huawei and ZTE, citing national security concerns.

Section 1.50002 of the Commission's rules mandates that the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau publish a "Covered List" of communications equipment and services deemed to pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security or the safety of U.S. persons. This designation is based on specific sources of risk assessment. Telecommunications providers in the U.S. are prohibited from using Federal Communications Commission (FCC) funds to acquire such equipment or services. The Covered List includes several foreign companies, such as Huawei, ZTE, Hytera Communications, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology, Dahua Technology, AO Kaspersky Lab, China Mobile International USA, China Telecom (Americas) Corp, Pacific Networks Corp, and China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited. Telecom providers are also required to remove any equipment or services from companies on this list from their networks.

Section 535 in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (H.R.933) bars the Departments of Commerce and Justice, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Science Foundation from procuring any information technology (IT) systems that are produced, manufactured, or assembled by any company owned, directed, or subsidised by the People’s Republic of China unless the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has completed an assessment of the security risk of cyber espionage or sabotage associated with the system to the United States.

Under the Trade Agreements Act (TAA), if the acquisition value of the tender is above a certain purchasing threshold (usually USD 200,000, although sometimes lower), US suppliers must turn to either domestic producers or countries with which the US maintains a free trade agreement (FTA). The TAA opens procurement markets only for products from the US or these so-called “designated countries” and prohibits procurement of end products from non-designated countries (e.g. China, India, Indonesia, Thailand). The purchasing threshold that needs to be reached to involve the TAA depends on the FTA in question and is updated every two years.

Although the US is a signatory to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), its coverage schedules do not fully cover the three most relevant service sectors (CPC 752, 754, 84). While value-added telecommunications services are covered, the agreement does not cover procurement of public utility services, including telecommunications and automatic data processing (ADP)-related telecommunications services.

Azerbaijan has not adopted national legislation based on or influenced by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Electronic Commerce.

Azerbaijan has not adopted national legislation based on or influenced by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Electronic Signatures.

Art. 12 of the Law on Payment Services and Payment Systems stipulates that the issuance of electronic money within the territory of Azerbaijan may be undertaken solely by banks and local branches of foreign banks, the national postal operator, and electronic money institutions, meaning that only electronic money issued and authorised domestically is legally recognised. The issuer must immediately generate electronic money equivalent to the funds received for that purpose and ensure that the electronic money holder is able to use it. The currency, maximum permissible amount of electronic money, and the upper limit of obligations arising from electronic money issued by a single issuer are to be determined by normative acts of the Central Bank. Pursuant to Art. 13.2, legal entities, local branches of foreign legal entities, and individual entrepreneurs may acquire electronic money only by transferring funds from their respective payment accounts to the issuer. Art. 14 further requires electronic money institutions to submit information concerning payment accounts opened for such persons to the designated body of the relevant executive authority, in the manner and within the timeframe prescribed by that body. Arts. 52 and 57 govern the licensing of local branches of foreign payment institutions, foreign electronic money institutions, and foreign operators, thereby requiring any foreign payment service providers, electronic money issuers, or operators of payment systems seeking to operate in Azerbaijan to do so through licensed branch offices.

Section 2.1.4 of "The Preferential and Simplified Rules of Movement by Physical Persons through Customs Border of the Goods which Are Not Provided for Production or for Dealing Purposes" provides that certain goods may be brought across the customs border without payment of customs duties. This applies to goods delivered into the customs territory once per calendar month in the name of the same individual via international postal consignments or through a courier company, provided that their total customs value does not exceed the equivalent of USD 300.