According to Art. 26 of the Telecommunications Law, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology shall prescribe the standards of network equipment and telecommunication equipment that are exported. It is reported that a recommendation issued by the Post and Telecommunications Department is often required for the export of telecommunications equipment, depending on the nature of the equipment.

Section 27-A(ii) of the Electronic Transactions Law, as amended in 2021 by Law No. 7/2021, mandates the personal data administrator to seek the consent of the owner of data before any data transfer. However, the law does not further regulate the ways in which the owner's consent is sought.

Myanmar has not joined any agreement with binding commitments to open transfers of data across borders.

Myanmar does not have a comprehensive regime in place for all personal data. However, the Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens set out provisions for the protection of privacy and security of communications. These are supplemented by sectoral legislation, such as the Telecommunications Law 2013, which contains provisions related to the confidentiality of personal information.

Art. 27 of the Electronic Transactions Law requires personal data administrators to retain personal data for a specified period before destruction. However, the regulation does not define the exact duration for which the data must be retained.

Arts. 75 and 77 of the Telecommunication Law allow the government to intercept, suspend, or obtain any information that threatens national security and the rule of law in the country. The broad provision fails to specify which government agents are authorised to do this and what sort of information specifically constitutes the general terms such as national security.

Art. 4 of the Electronic Transactions Law allows the Government to obtain personal data for purposes related to the stability, tranquillity, and national security of the State. The regulation fails to specify what information constitutes the general terms, such as national security.

Section 8 of the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens, suspended in light of the state of emergency in Myanmar, enables public authorities or law enforcement to access personal data held by private organisations. It prohibits the interception of personal communications without a warrant, but it contains a vague exception allowing surveillance if permission is granted by the president or a government body.

A basic legal framework on intermediary liability for copyright infringement is absent in Myanmar's law and jurisprudence. It is reported that the Telecommunication Law does not explicitly hold intermediaries liable for the content, but some provisions are vague and could feasibly be interpreted to justify content removals.

A basic legal framework on intermediary liability beyond copyright infringement is absent in Myanmar's law and jurisprudence. It is reported that the Telecommunication Law does not explicitly hold intermediaries liable for the content, but some provisions are vague and could feasibly be interpreted to justify content removals.

It is reported that Myanmar imposes an identity requirement for SIM registration. Anyone wanting to purchase a SIM card has to provide their national ID card, or a passport in case of foreigners, to activate a new prepaid SIM card.

As of May 2021, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MoTC) reportedly issued a series of directives ordering mobile service providers to block all websites except a list of about 1,200 that have been approved by the military, following the military's orders directing service providers to restrict access to all but the listed websites and IP addresses. These included numerous banking and financial sites, a handful of entertainment platforms such as YouTube and Netflix, major news outlets such as the New York Times and the U.S. cable news network (CNN), and gaming platforms. In February 2021, the MoTC ordered all ISPs, mobile service providers, and international gateway managers to block access to Facebook and WhatsApp. In February 2021, orders to block Twitter and Instagram followed. While WhatsApp and Instagram were included on a list of approved sites in May 2021, Other secretive blocks on websites have reportedly been ordered since the military coup, affecting popular platforms such as Wikipedia as well as national media outlets. In addition, in 2021, it has also been reported that the Myanmar government banned virtual private networks (VPNs).
The list of permitted addresses was updated in 2022 to include business sites, including those of local companies; however, it remains uncertain whether subsequent updates have occurred since then. Notably, Facebook, Twitter and most Burmese-language independent media outlets are not part of the list and, as a result, remain inaccessible in the country. On the other hand, platforms such as Instagram, YouTube, WhatsApp, LinkedIn, Viber and Zoom apparently remained accessible.

The indicator "6.2.4 - Government Internet shut down in practice" of the V-Dem Dataset, which measures whether the government has the technical capacity to actively make internet service cease, thus interrupting domestic access to the internet or whether the government has decided to do so, has a score of 1 in Myanmar for the year 2023. This corresponds to "The government shut down domestic access to the Internet numerous times this year."
It is reported that since the military coup in February 2021, the military has frequently restricted connectivity by ordering internet shutdowns, slowdowns, and blocks while threatening service providers to ensure their compliance. The internet shutdown came in various forms: i) the nationwide cut-off of mobile data and fixed-line internet access; ii) nightly shutdowns affecting fixed-line (fibre-optic and cable) connectivity. Although the internet was on during the day in this period, users reported frequent short-term outages and slow speeds nationwide; iii) shut down public Wi-Fi connections; iv) shut down wireless broadband internet services indefinitely. Under orders from the military-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Transport and Communications has significant powers to cut off the internet without oversight or safeguards, as it controls much of the telecommunications infrastructure via the state-owned company Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications.

The Myanmar Printing and Publishing Law created the licensing regime for publishing houses, news agencies, and websites, and these outlets must register prior to producing content, including for publishing online.

According to Paragraph 5 of Directive 1/2022, the submission of tenders is open to all, except in the specific cases detailed in Paragraphs 4, 6, 7, and 8. Moreover, Paragraph 13 provides that procurement from international sources may be conducted in instances where the required goods are unavailable within the domestic market or where no authorised dealer has been designated by the manufacturer to distribute the foreign product locally.