Kazakhstan has not signed the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts.

Kazakhstan has not adopted national legislation based on or influenced by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Electronic Commerce.

Kazakhstan has not adopted national legislation based on or influenced by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Electronic Signatures.

In addition to the legal requirement of local processing of personal data in Kazakhstan introduced in 2015 in the Personal Data Law (Art. 12.2), pursuant to Art. 16.2 of the Law, a copy of personal data may only be transferred from Kazakhstan to a foreign country (including for purposes of processing) without prior permission from the personal data subject only if the recipient of the personal data is located in a country that protects personal data (at either the national level (by adopting national laws and regulations) or the international level (through international treaties). Pursuant to Art. 16.3 of the Personal Data Law, if no such protection is available, cross-border transfers of personal data are only possible if:
- The subject gives specific consent;
- In cases specified by international treaties ratified by Kazakhstan;
- In cases stipulated in the laws of Kazakhstan in order to protect the constitutional order, public order, rights and freedoms of an individual and a citizen, and public health and morality; and
- In the case of the protection of the constitutional rights of an individual and citizen, where getting the consent of the subject or their legal representative is impossible.
It is reported that national legislation does not specify a list of countries to which the transfer of data is prohibited, nor are there any criteria listed for determining the countries that provide a proper level of protection of personal data.

Kazakhstan has not joined any agreement with binding commitments to open transfers of data across borders.

Law No. No. 94-V provides a comprehensive regime of data protection in Kazakhstan. The Personal Data Law provides general regulations on the collection and processing of personal data and notably includes broad requirements for data localisation. In addition, the Amendment Law was introduced in July 2020, significantly extending data protection obligations for organisations. The Amendment Law introduces, among other things, further requirements for data collection and processing, obligations for data operators (similar to data processors), and redefines key concepts. The Amendment Law further establishes the competency of the data protection authority, including its powers and role.

As per the requirements of the Law on Amendments and Additions to Certain Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Information and Communications (2017), users have been required to identify themselves using government-issued digital signature technology or SMS verification in order to comment on domestic websites.
The law requires website operators to make it mandatory for users to enter into a formal agreement before they are permitted to post comments on local websites. The information provided in the agreement needs to be retained by the website and handed over to the authorities whenever asked.

According to Art. 25.2(10) of Law No. 94-V, an owner and/or operator of a personal data database, which is a legal entity, should appoint a person responsible for organising the processing of personal data (this requirement does not apply to the activities of courts). According to Art. 25.3, such a person is entrusted with the following duties:
- Exercise internal control over observance by the owner and/or operator of a personal data database and its employees of Kazakh law requirements in relation to personal data and its protection;
- Inform the employees of an owner and/or operator of the provisions of Kazakh law with respect to processing and protection of personal data;
- Exercise control over receipt and processing of applications from personal data subjects or their legal representatives.

In July 2019, the government introduced the Qaznet Trust Certificate under the Law on Communications, a machine-in-the-middle (MITM) technology that enables it to monitor users’ online activities. The certificate requires every internet user in the country to install a backdoor, allowing the government to conduct surveillance. This allows the government to conduct a so-called “man-in-the-middle” attack, which allows the government to intercept every secure connection in the country and see web browsing history, usernames and passwords, and even secure and HTTPS-encrypted traffic.
KazakhTelecom, the country’s largest telecommunications company, has said that citizens are “obliged” to install a “national security certificate” on every device, including desktops and mobile devices.
It is reported that the commentators and experts inside the country and abroad almost unanimously consider the certificate a government-initiated technology for the interception of encrypted user traffic via MITM attacks. Some of the 37 websites that University of Michigan researchers identified as targets of the certificate included Facebook, Gmail, Instagram, Mail.ru, OK, Twitter, VK, and YouTube, suggesting that its purpose was to “surveil users on social networking and communication sites.”
On 21 August 2019, Mozilla and Google simultaneously announced that their Firefox and Chrome web browsers would not accept the government-issued certificate, even if installed manually by users. Later, Apple announced that it would make similar changes to its Safari browser and that the certificate would not be installed. After this, the requirement for the installation of the certificate was postponed.
While required, the certificate appeared to affect a fraction of connections passing through the country’s largest ISP, Kazakhtelecom. This means that some, but not all, of the Kazakh Internet population was affected.
In December 2020, Kazakhstan once again tried to enforce the installation of the certificate. However, the enforcement once again halted after the protest of the major internet browsers. Although not enforced, the provisions for mandatory installation of the certificate remain in Kazakhstan's regulations.

A basic legal framework on intermediary liability for copyright infringement is absent in Kazakhstan's law and jurisprudence. However, the Agreement on Enhanced Partnership between the EU and the Republic of Kazakhstan, signed in March 2016, provides a safe harbour to European companies under several conditions. According to the agreement, an information intermediary is not liable, for example, if it does not initiate the transfer, if the end-user always takes the initiative, if it does not choose the recipient of the transfer if it does not choose or change the information contained in the transfer if it complies with the conditions of access to information, observes rules for updating information, does not interfere with the lawful use of generally recognised technologies, immediately deletes information or stops access to it, after receiving a notice.

A basic legal framework on intermediary liability beyond copyright infringement is absent in Kazakhstan's law and jurisprudence. However, the Agreement on Enhanced Partnership between the EU and the Republic of Kazakhstan, signed in March 2016, provides a safe harbour to European companies under several conditions. According to the agreement, an information intermediary is not liable, for example, if it does not initiate the transfer, if the end-user always takes the initiative, if it does not choose the recipient of the transfer, if it does not choose or change the information contained in the transfer if it complies with the conditions of access to information, observes rules for updating information, does not interfere with the lawful use of generally recognised technologies, immediately deletes information or stops access to it, after receiving a notice.

As per the requirements of the Law on Amendments and Additions to Certain Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Information and Communications (2017), users have been required to identify themselves using government-issued digital signature technology or SMS verification in order to comment on domestic websites. Failure to enforce the rule after April 2018 can lead to fines. The law requires website operators to make it mandatory for users to enter into a formal agreement before they are permitted to post comments on local websites. The information provided in the agreement needs to be retained by the website and handed over to the authorities whenever asked.

Amendments to the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Communications in 2016 obliged ISPs to monitor content passing through their networks and to decide whether to restrict any problematic material. The amendments do not specify how ISPs are to carry out this obligation. The Administrative Code, in force since 2016, imposes fines on ISPs for not complying with censorship orders.

It is reported that the government has extensive authority to block online content. The National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan (NSC) has controlled the State Technical Service (STS) since 2017, assuming the authority to block content and disrupt internet networks for investigative purposes and to prevent crimes. The NSC can act without a court order, though it must notify other state bodies within 24 hours. In 2017, the NSC and a number of other state entities adopted new rules for blocking or suspending networks, ICT resources, and other web resources. The rules are classified. There are no publicly available data on the extent of state censorship, although one unofficial estimate puts the number of blocked websites at more than 30,000. Ministries occasionally release information on content restrictions. For example, in August 2018, the Ministry of Information and Communication announced that it had blocked more than 1,800 online “materials” since the beginning of 2018 and intended to block 9,340 more through 534 court proceedings. It is also reported that in 2019, the government prohibited access to social media and temporarily blocked independent news websites. In February 2020, amid an outbreak of intercommunal violence between ethnic Kazakhs and the Dungan minority, the government temporarily blocked WhatsApp in a bid to stop the violence. Furthermore, in response to an access-to-information inquiry, the Ministry of Information and Social Development specified that in 2022, 14,469 pages were blocked following 774 requests from the regulator. Only 241 of those were registered in the .kz domain zone, and between January and May 2023, 6,175 more pages were blocked, 6,047 of which were based abroad.

The indicator "6.2.4 - Government Internet shut down in practice" of the V-Dem Dataset, which measures whether the government has the technical capacity to actively make internet service cease, thus interrupting domestic access to the internet or whether the government has decided to do so, has a score of 3 in Kazakhstan for the year 2023. This corresponds to "Rarely but there have been a few occasions throughout the year when the government shut down domestic access to Internet."